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World’s growing energy demand has pushed oil companies to explore and produce 
hydrocarbons in complex and technologically challenging deepwater environments. These 
difficult and complex operations involve the risk of major accidents as well, demonstrated by 
disasters such as the explosion and fire on the UK production platform Piper Alpha and 
capsizing of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). Accidents cause death, 
suffering, pollution of the environment, disruption of business and bad reputation to oil industry.  
A quantitative risk analysis technique has been used in this study to identify and 
categorize risk associated with different life phases of a deepwater well. Volume of oil released 
to the environment is used as a risk indicator.  Five oil spill scenarios related to drilling and 
production life phases of a deepwater well are modeled.  
Risks associated with drilling an exploratory well in the deepwaters of GoM are analyzed 
in Scenario-1. A representative well location and corresponding reservoir properties were used to 
estimate the worst case discharge rates (WCD). Fault tree analysis (FTA) was performed to 
identify and categorize different hazards. Unexpected pore pressure and delayed response to an 
emergency situation were identified as two most important parameters contributing to overall 
risk of the system. 
In Scenario-2 an underground blowout was modeled by using representative geological 
settings from Popeye-Genesis field.  A shallower low pressure zone is exposed to a deeper high 
pressure zone during drilling. The time to recharge the shallower zone to its fracture pressure is 
estimated. The shallower zone will transmit hydrocarbons to sea floor once its fracture pressure 
is reached.  Risks associated with production life phase of a deepwater well are modeled in 
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scenario-3. A representative well location and corresponding reservoir properties were used to 
estimate the WCD. FTA showed that sand screen and subsea tree control failures were main 
elements contributing to risk. 
In scenario-4 risk associated with floating production and offloading (FPSO) system for 
GoM are quantitatively and qualitatively presented. Scenario-5 deals with oil spill risk associated 





















This section briefly introduces each chapter of the dissertation.  
Chapter one covers, basic elements of a spill scenario, introduction of techniques used for 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), oil and gas well barriers and their importance, and some 
of the data sources that can be used to conduct QRA of offshore operations.  
Second chapter deals with solution methodology adopted to perform the quantitative risk 
assessment. Selection of representative well, reservoir properties and fluid flow models are 
discussed in detail.   
In chapter 3 quantitative risk assessment of a deepwater exploratory oil well is presented 
and is referred as Scenario-1. A representative well from the Mississippi canyon in the Gulf of 
Mexico is studied for potential worst cases discharge (WCD) rates. Oil spill duration is estimated 
from historical spill durations and success of different spill response techniques. Product of 
WCD rate and duration gives the most probable oil spill amount. Blowout frequency is computed 
using fault tree analysis. Through sensitivity/importance analysis risk prone areas have been 
identified. The effectiveness of newly built response systems, called capping and containment 
systems is also analyzed in reducing the risk of large oil spills.  
Risks associated with the underground blowout (Scenario-2) are addressed in Chapter 4. 
It is assumed that during drilling a high pressure reservoir is accidently exposed to a low pressure 
shallower zone. A conducting fault or a highly permeable zone connects these zones. A 
representative reservoir’s settings from Popeye-Genesis filed in the deepwater GoM is selected 
to model this scenario. It is assumed that the shallower zone’s cap rock sealing capacity is lost 
when its pressure is reached to its leakoff test value. Then the set of exiting or induced fractures 
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or faults in the cap rock transmits the hydrocarbons to the sea floor.  Under these assumptions the 
charging time for the shallower zone to reach its leak off test value is estimated by conducting 
reservoir simulations. A parametric study is conducted by changing the shallower zone’s volume 
and connecting zone’s permeability and recharging time for shallower zone is estimated. 
In chapter 5, quantitative oil spill risk assessment of a production well (Scenario-3) is 
performed. It is hypothesized that a sand screen failure leads to a blowout. Representative well 
location, well barriers and reservoir properties in the GoM are selected to compute worst case 
discharge rates and blowout frequency. Spill duration is estimated based on the historic spill data 
and the effectiveness of various spill response techniques. Sensitivity/importance analysis is 
conducted using fault tree analysis and most sensitive areas are identified. 
In chapter 6 risk associated with FPSO (Scenario-4) are quantitatively and qualitatively 
studied.  FPSO is different from other production platforms due to its large storage capacity, 
station keeping requirements and shuttle tanker offloading. A proposed FPSO configuration for 
GoM is studied to estimate amount of spill during shuttle tanker transportations and fuel 
offloadings.  
Weather induced oil spill risks are analyzed in chapter 7 (Scenario-5). Severe weather can 
induce, mudslide, damage/destroy platforms and adrift of offshore floating structures.  An 
example oil spill volume calculation due to mudslide damage in SP-70 block of GoM is 
presented for platform damage, production riser’s damage and rupture of large oil carrying 
pipeline. 




CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF DEEPWATER OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS AND 
RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
Offshore oil and gas exploration and production operations, involve the use of some of 
the cutting edge and challenging technologies of the modern time. These technological complex 
operations involves the risk of major accidents as well, which have been demonstrated by 
disasters such as the explosion and fire on the UK production platform piper alpha, the Canadian 
semi-submersible drilling rig Ocean Ranger and the explosion and capsizing of Deepwater 
horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico. Offshore production may be one of the major sources of 
revenue for some of the companies and countries. 
Major  accidents  like Macondo represent  the  ultimate,  most  disastrous  way  in  which  
an  offshore  engineering project  can  end up. Accidents  cause  death,  suffering,  pollution  of  
the  environment  and  disruption  of  businesses. They  attract  attention  from the  news  media  
and  linger  in  the  public  memory for a long time,  causing  concern  about safety  of offshore 
oil and gas production operations. People may start questioning about the safety of offshore 
operations. In order to address these concerns and show that a balance between the interests of 
safety and the economics of oil and gas production can be achieved, a technique called 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) can be used. By conducting QRA, risk and their 
significance for the entire life phase of an offshore project can be quantitatively estimated. It will 
help in identifying the safety-critical procedures and equipment. QRA may also be used to show 
the project’s acceptability to regulators and workforce. 
1.1 Basic Constituents of a Spill Scenario 
The probability of occurrence of an oil spill and its consequences are a combination of 
the following factors, well’s life phase, geological features, reservoir potential, operational 
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complexities, water depths, type of installations and severe weather conditions. These are briefly 
described below. 
a) Well Life Phase: The life phase of a well is very important factor in describing the 
spill scenario. There are different risks associated with different life phases of a well. Operational 
conditions and the reservoir’s potential to flow varies with well’s life phase which result in 
different hazards with each life phase of an offshore well. For example, there are more risks 
associated with drilling an exploratory well as compared to drilling a development well. These 
risks are due to uncertainties in the geology and reservoir being at its full potential at the time of 
exploratory well.  An offshore well’s life span can be divided into three broad categories of 
drilling, production and abandonment phase. These are briefly described below.  
1- Drilling can be subdivided into exploratory and development drilling. 
2- Production can be subdivided into normal production operations and intervention  
3- Temporary Abandonment and Permanent Abandonment 
These are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Life phases of an offshore oil & gas well 
 
b) Geological Complexities: In GoM usually the operational window during drilling 
phase is very narrow, i.e. the difference between pore pressure and formation fracture pressure is 
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very low and most of the reservoirs in the GoM are over pressured as well. These conditions 
make the deepwater drilling in GoM more risky as compared to other regions of the world. 
c) Reservoir Potential: The potential of a reservoir to flow by itself is another major 
component when estimating the risk associated with an oil well. The reservoir potential depends 
upon pay zone’s thickness, its aerial extent, porosity, permeability, initial reservoir pressure, 
original oil in place and to what extent the reservoir has been explored.  
d) Water Depth: The complexity of the operations during any life phase of an offshore 
well, increases with water depth. In the ultradeepwater (i.e. WD >3000 ft), the drilling operations 
become more complex, due to very small drilling window available. As a result either more 
casing strings should be deployed or some other techniques to successfully drill sections with 
narrow margins should be used such as dual gradient mud may be used, another complexity. 
Another example could be the long riser portion that may be exposed to high sea currents 
resulting in severe induced vibrations and cyclic loads. The sea water temperature decrease from 
80F
o
 to nearly 40F
o
 at the 10,000 ft water depth, this will creates additional problems in long 
riser section and additional consideration has to be taken during responding to a spill event. 
e) Ongoing Operations Complexity: The complexity of the ongoing operations, 
experience of the people conducting these operations and whether standard or ad-hoc procedure 
are followed to handle the unexpected events are one of the main factor in defining a spill 
scenario and associated risk. For example there is different risk levels associated with 
exploratory drilling as compared to development drilling,  similarly risk associated with normal 
production operations are different than that of intervening to enhance the production.  
f) Sever Weather Conditions: The regional weather condition are  also an important 
factor, although complex operations like setting casing are avoided during severe weather, but 
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the pattern of weather in different times of the year is also important. Loop currents in the GOM 
and hurricane season are a typical example. Severe weather can lead to mudflow in shallow 
water, whose consequences may vary from minor spill of few barrels to a major spill having 
thousands of barrels of oil. Harsh weather may also result in adrift of Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Units (MODUS), and if their anchor drags along the seafloor, they may damage pipeline or 
production risers or subsea trees and can result in an oil spill.   
e) Equipment reliability: Equipment reliability is used for the blowout probability 
calculations. Based on the failure rates of primary and secondary barriers, the failure probability 
of the whole system is calculated. Improvements in the barriers’ reliability will result in 
decreasing the blowout probability. 
g) Path taken by reservoir fluids: The path taken by the reservoir fluids and its final 
release points are important to find the worst case discharge rate. For example during drilling 
blowout, hydrocarbon coming out of reservoir can take one of the four following paths, drill 
pipe,  annulus between drill pipe and the casing, open hole flow or flow through the rock behind 
casing. 
1.2 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Hazards are defined as physical situations that have the potential to cause harm. The main 
hazards to offshore structures are fire, explosion, collision and falling objects. Accidents are the 
realization of a hazard. Accidents range from minor such as small gas leak to major accidents 
like deepwater horizon. The  term  ‘risk’  is  according  to  international  standards  (such  as  
ISO  2002) is the ‘combination of the probability/frequency of an event and its consequence’. 
Other standards, like ISO 13702 (ISO 1999b), have a similar definition: ‘A term which combines 
the  chance  that  a  specified  hazardous  event  will  occur  and  the  severity  of  the 
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consequences of the event’ (Vinnem, 2007). The likelihood of an event may be expressed either 
as a frequency (i.e. the rate of events per unit time) or a probability (i.e. the chance of the event 
occurring in specified circumstances). The consequence is the degree of harm caused by the 
event (John Spouge, 1999). ‘QRA’ is used as the abbreviation for ‘Quantified Risk Assessment’ 
or ‘Quantitative Risk Analysis’.  Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a means of making a 
systematic analysis of the risks from hazardous activities, and forming a rational evaluation of 
their significance, in order to provide input to a decision-making process (Spouge, 1999) 
A Quantified Risk Assessment of an offshore installation has the following main steps             
(Vinnem, 2007): 
1.   Hazard identification  
2.   Cause and probability analysis  
3.   Accidental scenarios analysis  
4.   Consequence, damage and impairment analysis  
5.   Escape, evacuation and rescue analysis  
6.   Fatality risk assessment  
7.   Analysis of risk reducing measures 
 
Figure 2: Schematic showing the necessary steps in risk estimation 
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The consequences of an incident may be related to personnel, environment, assets and 
production capacity. These are sometimes called ‘dimensions of risk’ (Vinnem, 2007). Only 
environmental damages are addressed in this study. 
1.2.1 Environmental Damage 
Environmental damages due to spills are mostly dominated by the large infrequent spills 
from blowouts, pipeline leaks, storage leaks, transportation leaks and accident involving shuttle 
tankers. Small frequent process leak in the processing units, usually have low consequences as 
they do not cause extensive environmental damage. In this study environmental damage is 
categorized in terms of oil volume spilled to the sea, while the environmental risk is a 
combination of oil volume released its proximity to shore lines, its decay in reaching the shore 
lines and the sensitivity of the shore lines to oil spill. For the same volume of spilled oil, areas 
rich in fisheries and tourism will have greater environmental risk as compared to areas that are 
not abundant in fisheries and are not tourist’s destinations. 
The quantified risk to the environment is a combination of:  
 Approximate amount of oil discharged to the environment.  
 Frequency of events with similar consequences for the environment.  
Environmental consequences are often measured in terms of restoration time and the 
associated costs. ‘Restoration time’ is the time needed for the environment to go back to the 
same conditions, which existed before the oil spill. Expected spilled amount per year, Vsp , is 
expressed as: 
𝑉𝑠𝑝 = ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑞𝑉𝑛
𝑛
 
Where 𝑓𝑛 is the frequency per year and 𝑉𝑛is the amount spilled for scenario n. 
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The accumulated frequency 𝑓𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖 of events with similar consequences (restoration 
time) is defined as (Jan Erik Vinnem, 2007) 
𝑓𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖 = ∑ 𝑓𝑛. 𝑝𝑛,𝑖
𝑛
 
 Where 𝑓𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑖 is the accumulated frequency of events with similar consequences and 
𝑝𝑛,𝑖 is the probability of environmental consequence i for scenario n. 
Quantification of risk to the environment is estimate as the product of blowout/accident 
frequency and the resultant spilled volume of oil. The quantitative risk is presented in the form of 
risk matrix. A high flow rate or a longer duration spill will result in a greater oil volume released 
to the environment, and therefore has potential for greater consequences. The blowout duration 
depends on the effectiveness of different response systems deployed. It may range from few 
hours, to almost 90 days i.e., time taken to drill a relief well in the deepwaters of GoM. Timely 
capping or containing the well will reduce the overall spill oil volume and will result in reduced 
risk.  
The categories of environmental damage may be defined as follows (Vinnem, 2007):  
 Minor - environmental damage with recovery between 1 month and 1 year.  
 Moderate - environmental damage with recovery between 1 and 3 years.  
 Significant - environmental damage with recovery between 3 and 10 years.  
 Serious - environmental damage with recovery in excess of 10 years. 
In this study damage to the environment is defined in terms of oil volume released to the 
environment. Therefore for large oil spills, the environmental impact can be defined in terms of 
spilled oil volume as shown below, these are based on the recovery time after the Macondo 
incident. It is to be pointed out that environmental damage will also depend on the location of the 
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blowout, its proximity to the environmental sensitive areas alongside the spilled oil volume. 
Keeping in view of the restoration time for Macondo incident, following approximated ranges 
are defined  
 Minor: Impact = 1, Spill amount ≤ 0.5 Million bbls 
 Moderate: Impact = 2, Spill amount > 0.5 and ≤ 1.5 Million bbls 
 Significant: Impact = 3, Spill amount > 1.5 and ≤ 3.5 Million bbls 
 Serious: Impact = 4, Spill amount > 3.5 Million bbls 
The probability/frequency of an incident is categorized as 
 Low (p≤ 9 %) 
 Moderate (9 < p ≤ 29%) 
 Significant (29< p ≤ 59%) 
 High (59< p ≤ 100%) 
These values are based on some estimates about the range of higher and lower values and are 
purely intuitional. 
1.3 Objectives of this Study 
The main objectives of the study were to  
 Study different life phases of an offshore well, starting from exploratory drilling 
to permanent plug and abandonment phase, in order to identify the key areas 
contributing to overall oil spill risk during these life phases. 
 Develop a systematic procedure to generate and understand a variety of offshore 
oil spills scenarios.  
 Perform Quantitative Risk Assessment of different spill accidents  
 Develop/Suggest strategies to mitigate the risk associated with offshore spills 
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1.4 Well Barriers and Well Control 
To  prevent  a  blowout, a well  is  equipped  with  pressure  control  equipment  and  
barriers. In  all  well  operations,  two  tested  and  independent  well  barriers  should be  in  
place  at  all  times.  Each barrier  is  in  itself  intended  to  prevent  uncontrolled  flow  of  
reservoir  fluid  to  the  surroundings (called blowout).  
1.4.1 Barrier in Normal Drilling Operations 
The primary barrier in drilling operations is the hydrostatic pressure of the drilling mud.  
The hydrostatic pressure is the pressure exerted by the column of mud. Sometimes  there  is  also  
a  pressure  contribution  from  pumping  of  mud  into  the  well,  called circulating mud 
pressure. In conventional overbalance drilling, wellbore pressure is always kept higher than the 
pore fluid pressure. Otherwise, an influx of reservoir fluids into the wellbore may occur (called 
kick). The density of the drilling fluid is adjusted to obtain the appropriate wellbore hydrostatic 
pressure.  The  density  is  controlled  by  varying  the  concentration  of  high  specific gravity  
solids  within  the  fluid,  such  as  barite. 
An essential part of well control strategy is to maintain the appropriate mud weight 
throughout the drilling process.  If  the  pore  pressure  of  the  formation  increases,  the  mud  
density  must  be  increased accordingly,  to  keep  the  well  overbalance.  In overbalance 
drilling, the hydrostatic pressure created by mud column is   always kept between the pore 
pressure of surrounding formations and fracture pressure at all time. The difference between the 
formation fracture pressure and formation pore pressure is often referred to as the drilling 
window.  As the casings are set, the overlying formations are secured from collapse or fracture, 
and the mud weight can be increased for deeper zones. 
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If  the  primary  barrier  is  lost,  it  is  crucial  that  the  secondary  barrier  is functioning 
and can seal the well. If secondary barrier also fails while having a kick, then the situations can 
easily escalate into a blowout where reservoir fluids may flow from the well into the 
surrounding.  During drilling secondary barrier are blowout preventer (BOP), casings, cement 
and wellhead seals. Casing, cement and wellhead seals are passive barriers i.e. once setup they 
are always there, while BOP is an active barrier, whose systems can be activated when required. 
A blowout may only occur when both well barriers fail simultaneously. In addition to the 
physical well barriers, well control is an important element of preventing a blowout.  Well 
control is the procedure and process related to regaining control of a well in the event of failure 
or defect in one of the physical well barriers. During a well control situation the secondary 
barrier will always be important to prevent the uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons (NORSOK 
Standard, 2013).  
1.4.2 Barriers during Normal Production Operations 
The primary barriers in the production phase of the well life are production packer, 
completion string and surface controlled subsurface safety valve and the most important 
secondary barriers are subsea tree, casing cement, wellhead and tubing hanger.  
1.5 Scenarios Studied  
In this study five scenarios related to drilling and production life phase of an offshore 
well are modeled.  The decommissioning phase was not analyzed, as the probability of having a 
large spill for a short duration is very unlikely as the reservoirs are depleted in that life stage. The 
five scenarios modeled in this study are briefly described below. 
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1.5.1 Scenario-1: Drilling/Man-made/High potential 
An exploratory oil well drilled in the Mississippi Canyon block in the GoM is studied to 
analyze the associated oil spill risk. It is assumed that an uncontrolled kick develops into a 
blowout when the well control procedures failed along with the failure of one of the secondary 
barrier, mainly blowout preventer. An event tree of the process is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Kick leading to a blowout during exploratory drilling 
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1.5.2 Scenario-2: Drilling/Underground/Flow outside the well 
An underground blowout (UBO) of specific geological features present in the Popeye-
Genesis field in the GoM is analyzed in this scenario, to quantify the associated risk. It is 
assumed that during drilling a high pressure deeper reservoir is accidently exposed to a shallower 
depleted zone through a conductive fault. When the shallower zone’s pressure becomes equal to 
its leak off test value, it is assumes that it will transmit the hydrocarbons to the sea floor.  The 
consequences of underground blowout range from no visible damage at the surface to total loss 
of the well. An event tree description of UBO is shown below in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Event tree of an underground blowout 
 
1.5.3 Scenario-3: Production/Man Made/High Potential/ Sand Screen Failure  
 In this scenario, oil spill risks associated with normal production life cycle of a 
deepwater well are studied.  It is assumed that sand screen failure of a newly completed well 
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leads to a blowout and hydrocarbons are discharged to sea floor. An events tree showing the 
sequence of events is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Sand control element failure leading to a blowout for a producing well, the expansion 
of only the production packer branch is shown 
1.5.4  Scenario-4: Production FPSO/Man Made/Nature  
In this scenario, the spill risk associated with Floating Production Storage and Offloading 
(FPSO) vessel are discussed. FPSO has certain advantages over other type of production 
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platforms, due to its reuse, quick mobility and ability to work in harsh weathers. Meanwhile 
FPSO differs in their large storage capacity, Station keeping requirement and transport through 
shuttle tankers as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Differences between FPSO and other type of production platforms  
 
1.5.5 Scenario-5: Severe Weather/Loss of Position/Mudslide/Production Halt  
In this scenario the oil spill risk associated with severe weather conditions in the GoM are 
analyzed. GoM is prone to hurricane of categories 1 to 5. This type of severe weather may result 
in pipeline or platform damage and its consequences can range from minor to very large oil 
spills. 
1.6 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis is a top-down approach and  is  a  logical  representation of  the  many  
events  and  component  failures  that  may combine to cause the system or top event failure 
(Stamatelatos, 2002). It uses ‘logic gates’ (mainly AND or OR gates) to show how ‘basic events’ 
may combine to cause the critical ‘top event’. FTA has several potential uses in offshore QRA 
(Spouge, 1999):  
 In frequency analysis, it is commonly used to quantify the probability of the top event 
occurring, based on estimates of the failure rates of each component.  The top event may be an 
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individual failure case, or a branch probability in an event tree, in this study it is the blowout 
probability.  
 In risk presentation through importance/sensitivity analysis, it may also be used to show how 
the various risk contributors combine to produce the overall risk and sensitivity of top event by 
variation of basic event. 
 In  hazard  identification,  it  may  be  used  qualitatively  to  identify  combinations  of  basic  
events  that  are sufficient to cause the top event, known as ‘cut sets’. 
If quantification of the fault tree is the objective, downward development should stop 
once all branches have been reduced to events that can be quantified. Standard symbols used in 
this study for fault tree construction are shown in, below in Table 1. 
Table 1: Standard symbols used in the fault tree analysis 
Fault Tree Symbols Description 
 
The Circle describes the basic event that requires no 
further development. In other words, the circle signifies 
that the appropriate limit of resolution has been reached 
(Fault Tree Handbook). 
 
OR GATE - Event occurs if any input events occur 
 
AND GATE - Event occurs if all input events occur 
 
TRANSFER IN - Event developed down elsewhere 
 
TRANSFER OUT - Event developed up elsewhere 
 
In construction of fault tree top down approach is followed. Construction usually starts 
with the top event, and works down towards the basic events. For each event, it considers what 
conditions are necessary to produce the event, and represents these as events at the next level 
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down. If any one of several events may cause the higher event, they are joined with an OR gate. 
If two or more events must occur in combination, they are joined with an AND gate. 
1.6.1 Algebraic gate operations with probabilities 
OR Gate: Consider a random experiment that can have two possible independent 
outcomes A and B, which are mutually exclusive. This means that A and B cannot happen during 
a single trial of the experiment. Like when we toss a coin we cannot have head and tail together. 
For these mutually exclusive events, the probability of occurrence of either A and B (OR Gate) is 
given by 
𝑃(𝐴 𝑜𝑟𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) 
For events that are not mutually exclusive the probability of occurrence A or B is given 
by the expression 
𝑃(𝐴 𝑜𝑟𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) − 𝑃(𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵) 
For three events A, B and C we have 
𝑃(𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐵 𝑜𝑟 𝐶)
= 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) + 𝑃(𝐶) − 𝑃(𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵) − 𝑃(𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶) − 𝑃(𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶)
+ 𝑃(𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶) 
If the PA&B is small ≤ 0.2 than 𝑃(𝐴 𝑜𝑟𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) with error ≤ 11%. Then this 
approximation is called “rare event approximation” (Stamatelatos, 2002). 
AND Gate: Now consider the two events that are mutually independent. This means that 
if some experiment is performed several times, the occurrence of A has no influence on the 
subsequent event B and vice versa. Then the probability of these mutually independent events 
(AND Gate) is given by 
𝑃(𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵) 
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For events that are that are not mutually independent we need to use the concept of 
conditional probability. For example 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) is the probability of event B, given that event A has 
already taken place. 
𝑃(𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵)𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) 
If A and B are mutually independent, then 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) and𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵). 
 
1.7 Reliability Analysis 
The science of reliability prediction is based upon the principals of statistical analysis. 
Reliability  is  defined  as  “the  probability  that  equipment  will  perform  a  specified function  
under  stated  conditions  for  a  given  period  of  time”  which  defines  a  probabilistic  
approach  rather  than  a  deterministic  one.  This probability can be calculated or stated to reside 
within certain statistical confidence limits. To calculate the reliability of the system, its failure 
rate or Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) and /or the Probability of Failure on Demand (PDF) are 
needed. The most comprehensive subsea equipment reliability data is available through OREDA 
(Offshore Reliability Data) database software containing the latest data available. The OREDA 
2009 Handbook contains offshore subsea and topside equipment reliability data till 2003, from 
which some of the equipment reliability data is used in this study. As there is increased activity 
in the past few years in deepwater, so use of data from OREDA online database will provide 
more accurate results as compared to using the OREDA handbook data.  
1.8 Data Sources 
Blowouts are one of the main risks associated with the exploration and production 
operations in deepwaters. The quality check of the input data is an important aspect required to 
ensure a satisfactory quality risk analysis procedure. Good input data quality will result in 
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providing a realistic risk picture, which is critical for the evaluation of risks and for their use as a 
basis for decision making. Some of the data sources that are typically used in offshore 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) are show in Table 2 & Table 3. Only the main sources are 
mentioned, besides these a number of papers, reports, etc., may also be used from time to time, 
for specific subjects. Extensive data is needed for detailed modeling and therefore modeling and 
data sources are often closely coupled. 
 
Table 2: Some of the blowout and reliability data sources and their availability 











Available on disk: 






Available on disk: 
Annual license fee 
required 
BSEE 
All accidents and 
spills on US shelf 
Reports 
Offshore Blowout 
Causes and Control 
All blowout 
worldwide 
















BSEE (MMS) GoM BOP 
























Table 3: Some of the data sources for equipment leaks, vessel collision, falling objects and 
transportation accidents. Detailed references can be found in the additional references section 
 
Data Type Source Coverage Availability 




UK Health and Safety 
Executive 
UK Operations Report 
OGP World wide Report 
Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate 






AME Loss of containment 
Report (AME, 2003) 
North Sea Report 
OGP World wide Report 
RNNS Report Norwegian section Report 
Vessel Collision 
  
UK Health and Safety 
Executive 
UK Operations Report  




WOAD Worldwide Offshore DNV report 
OGP World wide Report 
UK Health and Safety 
Executive 
North Sea Report 
Helicopter Accidents 
  
OGP World wide Report 
UK and Norwegian Civil 
Aviation Authorities  











CHAPTER 2: FRAMEWORK FOR RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
Key elements in developing oil spill scenarios and quantitatively analyzing their 
associated are estimation of worst case discharge rates and duration of spill. However,  there  is  
no  standardized  method  for  calculations  of  these  values  which  can  easily  be 
communicated and compared between different scenarios. The first phase of the work process is 
finding and determining, representative accurate input parameters, which are the most time-
consuming part of the analysis, some of the required parameters are shown in Table 4.   
Table 4: Typical required input parameters for estimation of worst case discharge rates for 
drilling and production scenario 





















Bubble point pressure Bubble point pressure 
Permeability Permeability 
API gravity API gravity 
Water cut Water cut 
Oil formation factor Oil formation factor 








Casing program Casing program 
Riser Riser 
BOP Subsea Tree 
Drill pipe Production Tubing 
Open hole section Packer, SCSSV 
Oil Spill 
Duration 
Historical trend Historical trend 
Relief well Relief well 
Capping stack Capping stack 






Topside release probability Topside release probability 
Subsea release probability Subsea release probability 
Flow path probability Flow path probability 
Reservoir penetration depth Reservoir penetration depth 
BOP state (opening) Restriction in Flow path 
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Here parameters such as representative well location, well geometry, reservoir properties, 
spill response technologies and probabilities of different blowout scenarios must be accurately 
determined for true representation of the regional properties. This data must be carefully 
considered to achieve as accurate results as possible.  
2.1 Representative Well Location 
Two representative GoM wells, one for Neogene (deepwater) and second from Paleogene 
period (ultradeepwater) were selected for the analysis purpose.   The two red dots in the flowing 
Figure 7 show the location of the selected wells. The deepwater well is in Mississippi Canyon 
while the ultra-deep well is in Alaminos Canyon of Gulf of Mexico.  
 
Figure 7: Map showing GOM blocks with two selected representative well locations 
 (http://www.geographic.org/deepwater_gulf_of_mexico/definitions.html) 
 
2.2 GoM Geology 
Neogene Example: An understanding of salt and sediment interaction is critical to assess 





interaction. The Neogene geology of GoM can be categorized in four major groups of Plio-
Pleistocene Fluvial Sandstone, Upper Miocene Deltaic Sandstone, Middle Miocene Deltaic 
Sandstone and Lower Miocene Slope and Fan Sandstone. The source rock for these plays is the 
deep upper Jurassic and through vertical migratory paths, hydrocarbons travelled and trapped by 
these low lying Neogene traps. Some of the faults in these plays are nearly horizontal and they 
sometime provide barriers to the flowing fluid and help in trapping the migratory hydrocarbons. 
Most of these sands are not very thick and multiple sands are stacked as well. 
 Paleogene Wilcox Example: Deepwater Gulf of Mexico contains numerous geologic 
plays at different reservoir depths with proven hydrocarbon resource. Among these plays is the 
Wilcox, where exploration and appraisal drilling has increased since 2001, and reported 
successes indicate that the play holds significant producible hydrocarbons in the order of multi-
billion barrels.  However, depth, location, and reservoir characteristics of the offshore Wilcox 
play present various challenges to commercial development of the Wilcox formation even with 
today’s technology (Joshua Oletu etal. 2013). The deepwater GOM Wilcox trend comprises 
Upper (or Late) Paleocene to Lower (or Early) Eocene age fan turbidites that stretch over some 
400 miles from Alaminos Canyon in the west to Atwater Valley in the east.  The Wilcox is a 
subunit of the Lower Tertiary system.  The dominant sediment source is believed to be onshore 
deltaic, with clastic sediments deposited in a complex slope system, resulting in minibasins and 
base of slope fans. 
2.3 Representative reservoir properties 
Representative reservoir sand properties both for Paleogene and Neogene reservoirs are 
briefly described in the following sections. 
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2.3.1 Reservoir Pressure 
The Wilcox is hydrostatically pressured to geo-pressured with reservoir pressures ranging 
from 7,000 to 29,000 psia (Joshua Oletu etal. 2013) as shown in Figure 8 (a). The general trend 
is increasing pressure with depth, and with the same depth spatial variations are also present. For 




Figure 8: (a) Reservoir pressure variation for Paleogene period Wilcox sand in the GoM 
(joshua oletu etal. 2013), (b) pressure variation with depth in the gulf of Mexico with geological 
time scale (haeberle, 2005) 
 
The general trend of pressure variation with depth in the GoM with geological time scale 
is also shown in Figure 8 (b). A wide spread and nonlinear behavior can also be spotted. A fitted 
black trend line shows the approximate values with depth, and the fitted trend could over or 
under predict as well. 
 
2.3.2 Reservoir Temperature 
The Wilcox formation temperature ranges from 130 to 300 F
o
 , and different depth trends 








depth, there could be a spread in the values of temperature for various sands, shown in Figure 9 
(a) and (b). The generic trend for temperature variation with geological time scale, is shown in 
Figure 9 (b).  
 
  
 Figure 9: (a) Reservoir temperature variation for Paleogene period Wilcox sand in the 
GoM (Joshua Oletu etal. 2013), (b) temperature variation with geological time scale (Haeberle, 
2005) 
 
2.3.3 Porosity and Permeability Trends 
The  dominant  pore  type  in  the  Wilcox  reservoir  sands  is  intergranular  porosity  
with  average  effective porosities ranging from 7% to 29%, there are few exceptions as well. 
Representative sand data used for this study indicate different permeability vs. porosity 
relationships depending on the Wilcox unit and its location in the basin. The available data also 
show that apart from only one sand in the ultradeepwater in the Alamos Canyon permeability in 
general for the Wilcox units is in the order of or less than 10 mD. It is pointed out by Joshua et 
al. (2013) that due to insufficient core data from wells in the Keathley Canyon and Walker Ridge 




2.4 Reservoir Properties with Lognormal Distribution 
The representative reservoir properties for both Neogene and Paleocene type of reservoir 
were obtained from (RPSEA , 2010). Due to the large spread in the reservoir sand properties, 
therefore instead of a single constant value, a series of values were assumed. In this way, the 
spatial variation in the reservoir properties can be effectively accounted for.  
 
Table 5: Reservoir properties obtained by fitting lognormal distribution and using Monte Carlo 
simulation 
 Neogene Paleogene 
Variable P50 P90 P50 P90 
PR (psi) 11305 12436 19374 20444 
Temperature (F0) 210 222 210 243 
Thickness h (ft) 106 126 140 187 
Permeability (mD) 246 448 15 20 
GOR (SCF/STB) 1700 2033 160 180 
Pb (psi) 6306 6306 4500 4500 
API Gravity 28 28 25 25 
Water Cut (%) 22 23 25 30 
Bo (rb/STB) 1.39 1.44 1.153 1.3 
Reservoir Radius (ft) 8840 9954 8345 9491 
Wellbore Radius (ft) 0.7 0.753 0.54 0.68 
Oil Viscosity (Cp) 0.8 0.98 6.12 10.17 
PI (STB/day/psi) 19.05 35.68 0.2385 0.3922 
 
It is a well-known fact that permeability variation follows lognormal distribution, 
therefore a combination of lognormal and triangular distribution was assumed for different 
reservoir parameters. The input for each parameter is their mean value and the standard 
deviation. The data for the two type types of selected sands is shown in Table 5. P50 and P90 
values of each of the series were found by using @Risk software and Monte Carlo simulation 
were performed to find the P50 and P90 values for productivity index as well. Simulations for 
worst case discharge rate were carried out using the P50 values only, as it is the most 
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representative value. For some of the parameters fixed values found in the literature are used, as 
changing them and fitting a distribution might not represent well the corresponding sand.  
2.5  Selected Well Schematics  
Two representative well locations, one from the deepwater (Neogene Era sand-
Mississippi Canyon) and second one from the ultradeepwater (Paleocene Era sand-Alamos 
Canyon) were selected to estimate worst case discharge rates. The well schematics are shown in 
Figure 10.  
 
  
Figure 10: Well schematic (a) deepwater well: Neogene GoM (Fontenot, 2013), (b) 





The open hole section is 500 ft with reservoir located at the TVD of 21350 ft. The 
thermal conductivity of casing material is 27.73 Btu/ft-h-R, heat capacity is 0.119 Btu/lbm-F
o
 
and density 490 lbf/ft
3
. The difference between the Neogene and Paleogene well is in the water 
depth and the length of the last liner, while all other parameters are same for the fluid analysis 
purpose. 
Table 6: The casing program for the selected deepwater Neogene well (Fontenot, 2013) 









Conductor 26″    136.4 3000 5250 3000 
Surface 20″    133.0 3000 6000 3000 
Liner 18-5/8″   94.5 5800 6700 6200 
Liner 16″    84.0 5600 7700 7200 
Intermediate 13-3/8″    86.0 3000 9150 8150 
Liner 10 ¾″    55.5 8850 11650 10650 
Liner 8-5/8″    40.0 11450 16726 13450 
 
Only Neogene sand due to their high potential of flow are discussed in detail, while for 
the selected Paleogene reservoirs, the flow was not significant or not at all. Therefore they are 
not disused in detail and only flow rates are given in appendix B. 
2.6 Fluid Flow Simulation Setup 
Black oil is used in the simulation as the reservoir fluid, with the oil, gas and water 
properties shown in the Table 7. 









Temperature Profile: The sea water temper decreases with water depth from 79 F
o
 at the 
sea surface to nearly 40 F
o
 at 3,000 ft depth selected for deepwater Neogene well. Below the 
mud line a linear geothermal gradient was assumed with 40 F
o 
at mudline and then  temperature 
linearly increases with depth to 210 F
o
 at the target depth of 21350 ft. 
 
Inflow Performance Relationship (IPR) 
Two component IPR was used with linear profile for PR > Pb and quadratic for the case if 
PR < Pb.  
 
𝑞 = 𝐽(𝑃𝑅 − 𝑃𝑤𝑓)    for  𝑃𝑏 ≤  𝑃𝑤𝑓 ≤ 𝑃𝑅 
where q is the volumetric flow rate, PR is reservoir pressure, J is productivity index, and 
Pwf  is the well flowing pressure. 





2)  for 𝑃𝑤𝑓 ≤  𝑃𝑏 
where Pb  is the bubble point pressure. The productivity index for pseudo steady state 







+ 𝑠 − 0.75]
                                         (1) 
 
where k: permeability (mD), h: reservoir thickness (ft), re: reservoir radius (ft), rw: 
wellbore radius (ft), s: skin, μo: oil viscosity (cp), βo : oil formation factor  
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The initial reservoir pressure for the selected sand was above the bubble point pressures. 
For the partial penetrated well, the IPR was modified using the Papatzacos (1987) method of 
adding additional skin Sp for partial penetration. 
 
 






















]                               (2) 
 
         Where the parameters have the following definitions. 
 
 
With partial skin counted as Sp, the modified productivity index (PI) is shown in Eq. (3) 








) − 0.75 + (𝑠 + 𝑠𝑝))
                                 (3) 
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Reservoir Pressure Decline 
The reservoir pressure decline can be estimated, by using the material balance equation 
under the assumption that the reservoir is bounded with no aquifer support to maintain the 
pressure and production occurs due to expansion of the reservoir fluids only. The material 
balance results in the equation (4) 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖 −
𝑁𝑝 𝐵𝑜
𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑖
                                                       (4) 
Where  
Pt is the pressure at time t  
Pi is the initial reservoir Pressure 
Np produced oil volume 
Ni original oil in place 
Ct total reservoir compressibility 
Bo oil formation volume factor 
 
Total reservoir compressibility is calculated by using Hall’s correlation  
𝐶𝑡 =  1.87 × 10
−6𝜑−0.415 
 
and change in porosity can be estimated as 
𝜑 =  𝜑𝑜𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐶𝑡(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖)] 




CHAPTER 3: OIL SPILL RISK ASSESSMENT OF A DEEPWATER EXPLORATORY 




Major offshore accidents such as Macondo well incident highlight one of the possible 
failure modes and subsequent disasters when an offshore engineering project could go wrong. 
Such events can happen during any life phase of an offshore well - starting from the exploratory 
drilling phase to the final phase of plug and abandonment, but their potential to cause major 
environmental damage is greatest in their early life phase. Major factors that significantly 
contribute in defining such accident scenarios are the geological and operational complexities, 
equipment reliability, human factors, geographical/economy location, and weather conditions. 
The path taken by the reservoir fluids to reach the sea floor is also an important factor in 
determining the worst case discharge rates, as different paths provide different resistances to 
flowing fluid. Environmental risk of an oil/gas spill is also a function of the type of hydrocarbons 
released and amount of oil volume spilled.  
      A representative well from Mississippi Canyon in the Gulf of Mexico is studied for 
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of an oil spill in the exploratory life phase of a well. At the 
location of the well, sea water depth is 3,000 ft and total vertical depth of reservoir is 16,726 ft. 
The reservoir sand is associated with Neogene geological period and representative reservoir 
properties for this well are selected from literature. Due to the large spatial variation of reservoir 
properties, a single selected value will not truly represent the general behavior in that particular 
area, therefore a spread of values should be considered. In this study, this spread is in the form of 
lognormal & triangular distributions. From these distributions P10, P50 and P90 values can be 
obtained. To find representative value for productivity index, the variables were entered in the 
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form of series and 100,000 iterations of Monte Carlo simulations were performed to find P10, 
P50 and P90 values. Based on P50 value, the worst case discharge rate calculations were 
performed by using OLGA & PipeSIM (commercially available multiphase flow simulators). As 
only finding the WCD rates was the sole motive, therefore black oil fluid model was considered. 
Based on historical trend of blowing fluid coming to either sea floor or sea surface during 
blowouts, the following potential pathways are simulated: seabed and topside releases, restricted 
and unrestricted flow through BOP, flow with and without drill pipe. To study the effectiveness 
of newly built spill response technologies in reducing the risk of large oil spill associated with 
deepwater drilling activities; two model cases are considered and compared to each another. First 
model case is purely based on historical data and the second case is a modified version of the 
first model case in which the effectiveness of some of the recently built oil spill response systems 
e.g., capping and containment systems have been analyzed. The historical kick statistics and the 
equipment reliability data available from different sources is used to compute blowout 
probability. Reservoir properties combined with the release path is used to estimate WCD. Risk 
is calculated using the system failure probability and its consequence, and is presented in the 
form of a risk matrix for the different cases studied. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Deepwater offshore oil and gas production involves usage of some of the most advanced 
and challenging technologies of the modern time and is the main source of revenue for several 
companies and countries. These technologically complex operations involve the risk of major 
accidents as well, which have been highlighted by disasters such as the explosion and fire on the 
37 
 
UK production platform Piper Alpha, the Canadian semi-submersible drilling rig Ocean Ranger, 
and the explosion and capsizing of Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Major accidents like Macondo well blowout represent one of the disastrous failure mode 
in which an offshore engineering project can go wrong. Accidents cause death, suffering, 
environmental pollution, and business disruption. Due to their catastrophic impacts, these 
accidents receive large attention from the news media and remain in the public memory for a 
long time. Questions about the safety of offshore operations start emerging like are offshore 
platforms safe enough and can major accidents be prevented?  How should the offshore industry 
achieve an appropriate balance between the interests of safety and the economics of oil and gas 
production? Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is the right tool to address these and other 
related questions (Spouge, 1999). By carrying out the QRA of offshore operations, it can be 
quantitatively shown that a balance between economics of oil and gas productions operations and 
safety is achievable.   
3.1.1 Description of Capping and Containment System  
In the spill response systems, capping stack is the main component that is kept in 
readiness state at an onshore location. It is only deployed when the blowing well cannot be shut 
in with BOP that is already present on the well. Some of these capping systems are designed in 
such a modular way so that they can be easily transported internationally as well by planes. A 
capping and containment system in operation is shown in Figure 12 below (MWCC, 2011). In 
operational mode of a capping stack the following auxiliary systems are also part of the capping 
and containment system, subsea manifolds, subsea dispersant unit, free standing risers and 
collections vessels and tankers at sea surface (MWCC, 2011). The capping stack is supposed to 
be deployed to an existing BOP and can shut or contain the well depending on whether the well 
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can sustain the high shut in pressure. Capping stack also facilitates in injection of dispersants as 
well, in case they are needed.  
 
 
Figure 12: Capping and Containment system of Marine Well Containment Company 
(MWCC, 2011) 
 
3.1.2 Well Barriers 
 
To prevent a blowout, the well must be equipped with pressure control equipment and 
barriers. In all well operations, two tested and independent well barriers are in place at all times 
(NORSOK Standard, 2013). Each barrier in itself is intended to prevent uncontrolled flow of the 
reservoir fluid to the surroundings (blowout). In the drilling phase, the primary barrier is the 
hydrostatic pressure maintained by mud and the secondary barriers are BOP, casing, cement and 
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wellhead seals. A blowout can only occur when both of these barriers fails simultaneously. These 
barriers are shown in Figure 13. 
 




In order to calculate the quantified risk, the incident’s probability/frequency and its 
consequences are required. The incident frequency is computed from Fault Tree Analysis, while 
consequences in the form of oil volume released to the environment are found from multiphase 
fluid flow analysis in wellbore.  
 
3.1.4 Representative Well, Reservoir Properties, and QRA Procedure 
Representative properties for a reservoir corresponding to the selected well’s location are 
taken from literature (RPSEA, 2010) and are shown in Figure 14, alongside the result of fitted 





Permeability Reservoir Thickness Oil Viscosity 
   
Oil Formation Factor Reservoir Radius Productivity Index 
   
Reservoir Pressure Reservoir Temperature Gas Oil Ratio 
   
 
Figure 14: Results of Monte Carlo simulation and fitted log-normal and triangular distribution 
 
 
The chart for each parameter shows the Mean, Mode, Standard Deviation, 90% 
Confidence Interval, P50 and P90 values. The flowing potential of a well is usually expressed in 
the form of productivity index. It is usually denoted by capital letter “J” and is the ratio of fluid 
flow rate to the pressure draw down. 
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To ease the readability, the estimated P50 and P90 values for various reservoir parameters 
are shown in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Reservoir properties for one of the representative GoM deepwater sand (based on data 
from RPSEA, 2010) 
Variable P50 P90 
PR (psi) 11305 12436 
Temperature (F
0
) 210 222 
Thickness h (ft) 106 126 
Permeability (mD) 246 448 
GOR (SCF/STB) 1700 2033 
Pb (psi) 6306 6306 
API Gravity 28 28 
Water Cut (%) 22 23 
Bo (rb/STB) 1.39 1.44 
Reservoir Radius (ft) 8840 9954 
Wellbore Radius (ft) 0.7 0.753 
Oil Viscosity (Cp) 0.8 0.98 
PI (STB/day/psi) 19.05 35.68 
 
 
3.2 Historical Trends in the GoM 
3.2.1 Kick causes and Frequency 
Majority of the kicks 71% in the GoM were caused by low mud weight (Holand, 2007), 
that signifies the presence of unexpected pore pressures and narrow margins between the pore 
pressure and fracture gradient. While 19% kicks were caused by lost circulation and 10% due to 
swabbing effects; the data is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Deepwater GoM kick data with its causes (Holand, 2007) 
Primary cause of kick  No. of kicks Relative percentage 
Low mud weight 34 71% 
Lost circulation 9 19% 
Swabbing 5 10% 




The data for the kick frequency is extracted from reference (Holand & Awan, 2012). The 
data includes deepwater kicks for deepwater (depth > 2000 ft) wells spudded during the period of 
2007 – 2009 in the GoM outer continental shelf.  
 
 







No. of Wells 
Original Sidetrack 
or        
by-pass 
Total 
Development 7 42 11 53 
Exploratory 74 133 73 206 
Total 81 175 84 259 
 
The main source of this data was well activity reports in the BSEE’s e-Well system 
(Holand, 2007). Majority of the kicks > 91% as shown in Table 10 occurred during the 
exploratory drilling which signifies the presence of narrow margins between pore pressures and 
fracture gradient. This narrow window prohibits the use of higher density mud, and therefore 
safety margin cannot be increased above a certain limit. 
3.2.2 Blowout Frequency 
 The blowout is defined as an incident where formation fluid flows out of the well or 
between formation layers, after all the physical well barriers or the activation of these barriers 
have failed (OGP- No. 434-2, 2010). While the well release is defined as an incident where 
unintended hydrocarbons flow from the well at some point, but by using the installed barriers the 
flow is stopped. The historical blow out frequencies for the exploratory and development drilling 
for Gulf of Mexico are shown in Table 11. Blowout  probability  assessment  is  one  of  the  
main  activity  in  quantifying  the  risk  related  to drilling and well operations. In most of the 
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situations blowout probability is based on statistics, that uses historical data and if recent data set 
is small as compared to past data; the recent technological or operational improvements may not 
be portrayed well in the blowout probability analysis. The blowout probability might be 
considerably reduced in recent years, compared to the early records of historical databases, due 
to technological advances and better trained rig crews. The probability will also vary greatly 
from well to well, due to well specific characteristics. This is not reflected in statistical 
probabilities as they are averaged for the whole region. 
 
Table 11: Blowout probability during exploratory and development drilling in deepwaters of 
world except North Sea, data mostly consists of GoM (OGP- No. 434-2, 2010) 




Blowout (Surface Flow) Appraisal 1.40E-03 
Wildcat 1.70E-03 




Blowout (Surface Flow) - 3.50E-04 
Blowout (underground) - 1.30E-04 
Well release - 2.20E-04 
 
 
3.2.3 Blowout Duration 
 Due to non-existence of a standard procedure to calculate blowout probability, the 
procedure may vary from one oil company to another. Blowout duration is a function of the 
success of different well killing procedures; some of these are shown in Table 12. The selection 
of well killing procedure depends on the condition of blowing well, its location and access for 
the response systems to work. It is also dependent on the availability of rigs in the region and 
time taken to activate the response resources. A deepwater blowing well can be put under control 
by crew intervention, successful deployment of capping stack or drilling a relief well. The 
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probability of a well to kill by itself (bridging) in deepwaters is very low in comparison to 
shallow well (Smith, 2012), as most of deepwater sand are consolidated. 
 
Table 12: Blowout duration for deepwater wells when capping and relief well are the only option 
considered 
















Representative duration (days) 7 15 30 90 
Probability Subsea (Base Case) 0 0 0 1 
  Subsea (Capping 
Stack) 
0 0.6 0.3 0.1 
 
The representative durations for base and modified cases are determined as 
Relief well drilling duration (for deep to ultra-deep waters) = 90 days 
Capping Stack option duration = 7*0 + 15*0.6 + 30* 0.3 + 90 * 0.1= 27 days 
These values are used to find the volume of oil spilled.  
3.2.4 Reservoir Penetration and Kick Occurrences 
 Kicks may occur at any stage during drilling operations. Data supports the fact that kicks 
occur relatively quickly after penetrating the reservoir, thus in the very top part of the reservoir 
section (Oljeindustriens, 2010). In GoM most of the kicks are contribute to unexpected pore 
pressures i.e., kick occurs as we just tap the reservoir. The probability of occurrence of kick with 
respect to reservoir penetration is shown in  
Table 13.  Many kicks may occur as a result of swabbing, i.e., when pulling the drill pipe 
out of well. For swabbing it has been assumed that the entire reservoir could be exposed, as we 






Table 13: Relation between reservoir penetration and kick occurrence (Oljeindustriens, 2010) 
Drilling depth to the reservoir  Probability 
(%) 
Top of the reservoir (5%) 60 
Half of the reservoir 20 
Full reservoir exposed (drilled to TD) 20 
  
 
3.2.5 Flow Path Distribution and Restrictions to Flow 
 The path taken by the reservoir fluid and restrictions in its path are important when 
calculating the resultant flow rate for that scenario. There are a number a number of flow paths 
possible for the reservoir fluids to come to surface (Oljeindustriens, 2010 & Smith, 2012). The 
release to the environment could be at the rig floor or at subsea. The path could be through drill 
pipe, drill pipe-casing annulus, casing-casing annulus, casing-cement interface, open hole flow 
or through the rock as shown in Table 14.   
 
Table 14: Historical trends for hydrocarbon release (Oljeindustriens, 2010 & Smith, 2012) 
Scenario Probability Flow path Probability (%) 
Topside Release 
25% Drill pipe 11 
Annulus 78 
Open hole 11 
Subsea Release 
75% Drill pipe 11 
Annulus 78 
Open hole 11 
 
 
These flow paths may be restricted or unrestricted.  In this chapter only flow through the 
drill pipe, drill pipe-casing annulus and open hole flow are modeled.  Flow outside of the casing 
is modeled in underground blowout scenario chapter-4. 
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3.2.6 Flow Rate, Spill Duration and Fault Tree Analysis  
Commercially available multiphase fluid flow simulators PipeSim & OLGA were used to 
find the worst case discharge rate under different conditions. A linear geothermal gradient was 
assumed with well’s surrounding temperature at mud line of 40F
o
 and reaching to 210F
o
 at the 
reservoir depth. The specific gravities of oil, gas and water were taken to be 0.86, 0.67 and 1 
respectively. The viscosity was modeled using Vasquez & Beggs (1980) correlation. The 
roughness of wellbore and casing and drill pipe was assumed to be 0.001 inches. The overall heat 
transfer coefficient was taken as 2 Btu/hr/ft
2
 of a steel pipe.  The back pressure at the fluid outlet 
at seabed is fixed to be 1395 psi based on the average sea water gradient of 0.465 psi/ft for the 
Gulf of Mexico with a water depth of 3000 ft. 
 
The kick and the BOP equipment reliability data for Fault Tree Analysis are extracted 
from (MIDE, 2010), which is based on SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database (SINTEF, 2001).  
The failure rate of each of secondary barrier is assumed to be a uniform average rate with ± 10% 
spread in value and is expressed as failures per drilled well. In contrary to normal fault tree 
analysis where top event’s  frequency (blowout in this case) is to be found, based on the failure 
rates of basic events, in this case the top event probability is also known. The tree is calibrated in 
such a way that to obtain the same blowout frequency, the frequency of only well control 
procedures is adjusted while all other basic event frequencies are not disturbed and they 
represent the failure rates of those components, mentioned in the literature. Although a crude 
assumptions, all the basic events are treated as independent events, so that one’s failure will not 
trigger the failure of others. LOGAN Fault & Event Tree (LOGAN) software is used to conduct 
Fault Tree and sensitivity analysis. 
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3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Blowout Frequency/Probability Calculation 
The results of the Fault Tree Analysis are shown in Figure 16. The high failure rate of 
secondary barrier is mainly due to BOP’s control system’s failure, but due to redundancy in 
control modules, the situation does not result in complete BOP failure. Another  main contributor 
to the blowout are the well control procedures that are adopted after a well is kicked-in to stop 
the formation fluid from entering into wellbore and remove the kick to regain hydrostatic 
pressure necessary to keep formation fluids from entering into wellbore. The sub categories of 
well control procedures failures are adopted from (Anderson et al., 2012). 
Monte Carlo Simulations were performed to measure the uncertainty associated with the 
blowout frequency. One hundred thousand trials were performed and results are shown in Figure 








Figure 15: Blowout uncertainty analysis for 100,000 trials of Monte Carlo simulations with a 








Figure 16: Fault tree analysis of a deepwater exploratory drilling well 
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3.3.2 Fussell Vesely Importance Measure 
Fussell Vesely importance measure in Table 15, show that the blowout probability is 
mostly influenced by unexpected pore pressure with an importance value of 0.508.  It implies 
that even a minor improvement in decreasing the frequency of occurrence unexpected pore 
pressure will greatly influence the blowout frequency. The next main important basic event to 
focus in is the delayed response of personnel supposed to decide quickly and take an action in 
the emergency situation. Error not detected is the next important basic even.  
 
Table 15: Importance analysis showing the contribution of some of the most influencing basic 
events with the unexpected pore pressure is the main contributor 
 
 
Name Description Sensitivity 
UNEXPPP Unexpected Pore Pressure 0.508 
DELAYEDR Delayed Response 0.500 
ERRORND Error not Detected 0.300 
GASCUTMU Low Mud Weight Due to Gas Cut 0.236 
WRONRES Wrong Response 0.200 
CONTROL Main Control System 0.195 
CASING Casing Failure 0.192 
CEMENT Cement Failure 0.147 
OTHERS Lost Circulation and Others 0.144 
SWABBING Swabbing Effect Caused Kick 0.112 
WELLHED Wellhead Seals etc 0.101 
ANNULAR Annular Preventer 0.065 
RAM RAM Preventer 0.062 
CHKKILLL Choke & Kill Lines 0.046 
CASHEAD Casing Head Failure 0.046 
DIVERTER Diverter Failure 0.046 
STRINGVA Drill String Valve 0.046 
CONNECTR Connectors All 0.022 
UNKNOWN DUMMY ITEMS 0.019 
CHKKILLV Choke & Kill Valve 0.011 




This may include the absence/failure of sensors or overlooking some of the potential 
early indication of a problem. There is a room to improvement in these areas.  Unexpected pore 
pressure can be dealt with better seismic profiling and implementing one of the latest drilling 
technologies of either wellbore strengthening or drilling with managed pressure. These 
techniques will allow better control of bottom hole pressure and allow to drill in well sections 
where drilling window is very small. Delay in the response to an event of immediate concern can 
be managed with automating some of the initial response decisions and by overseeing the 
operations by remotely monitoring the rig activities and take quick decisions and guide the 
personnel on the rig floor.  
 
3.3.3 WCD Subsea Release Calculations for P50 Values 
A description of the cases modeled in this study is as following. Case numbers are 
assigned on the basis of flow path, reservoir penetration and restrictions offered in the flow 
paths. While case names are assigned, based on the spill response systems and the time they take 
to cap or contain a well and are shown below 
RF: Relief Well with duration of 90 days, CS: Capping & Containment System with 
effective deployment time of 27 days, CSI: Capping & Containment System with ideal 
deployment time of 15 days. 
Case ID is the combination of case name and its number. For example for case ID RF1, 
RF stands for relief well option for duration calculation and 1 denotes that the fluid is coming 
through drill pipe when the reservoir penetration is 5% and BOP is 100% open to flow. The 
WCD rates computed, based on the estimated P50 values of reservoir are shown in  
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Table 16. The maximum oil flow rate of 103,290 bbl/day was computed for RF13 case in 
which  drill pipe is out of the well  and no restriction to flow are offered by BOP  i.e. BOP is 
100% open.  
 
Table 16: Subsea release flow path probability and rates corresponding to P50 value 
(RPP:Release Point Probability,FPP:Flow Path Probability, PD:Penetration Depth, 


























RF1 Open 0.1 5942 0.0066 
RF2 Restricted 0.9 5536 0.0594 
50 0.2 
RF3 Open 0.1 28928 0.0022 
RF4 Restricted 0.9 18631 0.0198 
100 0.2 
RF5 Open 0.1 34546 0.0022 
RF6 Restricted 0.9 21121 0.0198 
Annulus 0.78 
5 0.6 
RF7 Open 0.1 5796 0.0468 
RF8 Restricted 0.9 5411 0.4212 
50 0.2 
RF9 Open 0.1 27945 0.0156 
RF10 Restricted 0.9 17859 0.1404 
100 0.2 
RF11 Open 0.1 32644 0.0156 
RF12 Restricted 0.9 20056 0.1404 
Open 
Hole 
0.11 100 1 
RF13 Open 0.1 103290 0.0110 
RF14 Restricted 0.9 26434 0.0990 
 
This situation occurs  when the well have been drilled to the total depth and preparations 
are going on for well cementing and due to swabbing effect some influx occurs and situation 
could not be controlled by using well control procedures. Even though the oil flow rate is highest 
in this case but fortunately the associated probability per blowout of 0.01 is very low. Therefore 
risk calculated from the combination volume of spilled oil and associated probability will not fall 
in high attention yellow zone on risk matrix.  
The case of fluid flowing through the annulus when the reservoir is partially penetrated 
and with restricted flow path has oil flow rate of 5411 BOPD only, but it has the highest 
probability of 0.4212 per blowout. Therefore the combination of lower oil volume and higher 
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probability will not result in a very high risk, as risk is computed from the product of probability 
and oil volume. In general the oil flow rates are substantially low when drill pipe was inside the 
well, due to the resistance it provides to flowing fluids.  
 
  
Figure 17: Pressure decline and flow rate variations with time 
 
Among all of the cases studied the following three cases of RF5, RF11 and RF13 have 
the highest flow rates, because they are for full reservoir penetration and with no flow restriction 
in the BOP. Full reservoir penetration results in less resistance to flow due to disappearance of 
partial penetration skin, and therefore for the same pressure drop a higher flow rate occurs if all 
other parameters remain same. Similar arguments can be made about the case in which BOP 
offers no restriction to flow.  These three cases based on their high oil flow rates were selected 
for further risk analysis by using the risk matrix. The fluid flow rates for these cases given in 
Table 16 are initial flow rates when the reservoir has the full potential to flow. As the time 
progresses in most of the cases reservoir pressure decrease and corresponding flow rate as well, 
unless the reservoir is connected to an infinite reservoir that can help in maintaining its pressure. 
The reservoir pressure decline and corresponding flow rates are shown in Figure 17. A pseudo 
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steady state assumption about the reservoir pressure decline is considered with time intervals of 
15 days each. The pressure exiting at the start of the interval is taken constant throughout the 15 
days period, which is the most conservative approach. No aquifer drive support was considered 
and the production was assumed to be due to expansion of pore fluids only. For the highest flow 
rate case of RF13, the reservoir pressure decreases from initial value  of 11305 psi to around 
8530 psi and flow rate from 104K BOPD to nearly 66K BOPD at the end of 90 days. While for 
the other two cases the reservoir pressure decline and reduction in flow rate are not substantial. 
3.3.4 Implications for Environmental Damage Assessment  
Environmental damage is computed from the product of blowout probability and 
resultant spilled oil volume. It is important to note that not every blowout will result in a large oil 
spill. Majority of the blowouts are of very short duration i.e., less than 2 days and result in small 
damage to environment.  
 
Table 17: Risk table categorized for functional BOP state during blowout with only relief well 













RF5 0.0022 3.06E-06 3.06E+06 3 9.17E-06 
Relief Well 
90 days 
RF11 0.0156 2.17E-05 2.90E+06 3 8.67E-05 
RF13 0.0110 1.53E-05 8.07E+06 4 6.12E-05 
Capping 
Stack 27 days 
CS5 0.0022 3.06E-06 9.30E+05 2 6.12E-06 
CS11 0.0156 2.17E-05 8.79E+05 2 4.34E-05 
CS13 0.0110 1.53E-05 2.79E+06 3 4.59E-05 
Capping 
Stack 15 days 
CSI5 0.0022 3.06E-06 5.18E+05 2 6.12E-06 
CSI11 0.0156 2.17E-05 4.90E+05 1 2.17E-05 




In terms of released oil volume in the past 50 years only 19 spills are reported in the GoM 
for all of drilling and production activities that are equal to or greater than 1000 bbl of oil. 
Macondo blowout is the biggest outlier with estimated 4.9 million bbl (Anderson et al., 2012) of 
oil spilled to environment. The maximum environmental damage is caused when all other efforts 
to stop the blowing well are failed and relief well is the only response option left. A time frame 
of 90 days duration is considered to drill a relief well for the water and well depths considered in 
this scenario.  
Please note that duration of relief well drilling may vary depending on the location of the 
well, water depth and target zone depth below mud line. In majority of the cases the blowout 
may be put under control in a few days’ time frame, either through crew intervention or by the 
deployment of spill response systems. The probability of spill having 90 days duration is 0.03 
only. The conservative approximate duration estimate for the successful deployment of capping 
and containment system is calculated to be 27 days.  Ideally these response systems are designed 
to cap or contain the blowing well within 15 days’ time frame. 
The risk calculations for the base and modified cases are shown in Table 17. The 
cumulative volume of oil discharged to the environment is calculated by using the durations for 
base and modified cases of 90 and 27 days respectively. The spilled amount estimate is for RF13, 
i.e., absolute open flow is around 8.07 million barrels of oil, resulting in impact factor of 4. Due 
to their low flow rates, the cases RF5 and RF11 result in impact of 3. With the application of 
capping and containment systems the impact factors are substantially reduced.  
In the event that the well integrity concerns prohibit the shut in by using capping and 
containment systems, these systems have the designed capabilities to collect the hydrocarbons up 
to 100,000 BOPD, which is nearly equal to the maximum oil rate calculated.  So most probable 
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scenario is that a large quantity of blowing hydrocarbons will be collected and not released to the 
environment, even when the well cannot be shut in completely. So in this situation even if we 
have to drill a relief well, most of the fluids comings out of the well are collected. Capping and 
Containment systems due to their large fluid handling capacity will substantially decrease the 
overall amount of oil spilled to the environment. 
3.3.5 Construction of Risk Matrix 
The risk matrix for the deepwater selected GoM exploratory drilling well is shown in 
Figure 18. The case RF13 due to its highest oil rate creates falls in the serious impact category, 
but due to its very low probability of occurrence this case fall in the yellow region, not in red. 
The yellow region corresponds to the situation, when operations can be carried out but with great 
caution and ideally green region is the desired operational window. In the red region, no activity 
is supposed to be carried out.  
 
 




With the deployment of capping and containment response system, the impact category 
of this case is reduced from serious-4 to significant-3 and that is a substantial impact reduction. 
But still it is in the cautionary yellow zone. If the capping and containment system is 
successfully deployed during their designed deployment time frame of 15 days, then the impact 
category is further reduced and it moves towards the green region. 
The impact factor for other cases of flow through annulus RF11 and through drill pipe 
RF5 are also reduced from significant to moderate level when capping and containment system is 
available. These results signify the importance of newly built response systems in reducing the 
risk of large oil spills. 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks on Risk Associated With Deepwater Exploratory Well 
 An example of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for deepwater exploratory drilling well 
blowout is presented, QRA facilitated in better understanding of blowout risks. 
 The selection of a specific well and corresponding reservoir properties and taking into 
account the regional variation in reservoir properties by fitting lognormal/triangular 
distributions and conducting Monte Carlo simulations, provided a realistic representation of 
the reservoir properties to calculate the worst case discharge rates. 
 Unexpected pore pressure, delayed response to an incident and failure to detect the error 
were found to be three most important basic events contributing to the overall risk of the 
system. These were identified by conducting Fussell Vesely (FV) importance analysis.  
 The FV importance analysis emphasize the need to focus on the technologies to provide 
early warnings for unexpected pore pressure during drilling phase, eliminating the delays 
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that can occur when responding to an emergency situation by automation of some of the 
decision processes and technologically improve the reliability of sensors that detect an 
error. Crew training and management is also an important element in responding to 
situations that needs immediate attention. 
 The worst case discharge rate of nearly 104,000 BOPD was estimated for the case when 
drill pipe is out of the hole and BOP offers no restriction to blowing hydrocarbons 
(conditions specified by BSEE to estimate WCD). The occurrence of this combination of 
events is amongst the least probable situations. Therefore risk which is a product of 
probability and spilled oil volume is not very high in this case. 
 The 100,000 BOPD oil handling capacity of newly built capping and containment systems 
is nearly sufficient to either capture or contain the computed worst case discharge oil rate 
of 104,000 BPD.  
 The reservoir pressure drop and resultant reduction in flow rate are not significant in the 
cases when the fluids are flowing either through drillpipe-casing annulus or through drill 
pipe.  
 The selection of the multiphase correlation also affects the worst case discharge rate 
estimates and computed values with some other correlation may differ from the values 
computed in this study, therefore this variation in values must be considered when making 
decision based on the WCD rates.   
 Restrictions in the flow path substantially decrease the fluid flow rate and in some of the 
circumstances may even choke the flow.  
 Newly built response systems are effective in reducing the risk of large oil spill in 
deepwaters environments, provided that they function properly when they are deployed. 
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Capping and containment systems are effectives for only one type of failure mode i.e., 
when the flow is coming through the well, which is the most probable scenario based on 
the historical blowout data. 
 Addition of intervention module in capping and containment systems will enhance their 
capabilities to deal with other failure modes as well. For example dynamic kill may be used 
in the case of an underground blowout.   
 In the case of a blowing well affecting nearby wells, the situation may become complex 
and would require additional modules to be added with capping and containment systems 

















CHAPTER 4: RISK ASSESSMENT OF A DEEPWATER GULF OF MEXICO 
UNDERGROUND BLOWOUT (SCENARIO-2) 
 
In an underground blowout, the uncontrolled formation fluids from higher pressure 
formation may charge up shallower overlying low pressure formations or may migrate to sea 
floor, following the path of least resistance. The consequences of these blowouts range from no 
visible damage at the surface to the loss of well, loss of drilling rig, seafloor subsidence or 
hydrocarbons discharged to the environment, a schematic of consequences is shown in Figure 
19. When detected, the main difficulty in responding to these events is the uncertainty associated 
with diagnosing and understanding what is actually happening at the subsurface [Smith et al., 
1999]. These blowouts might get unnoticed until the over pressured sands, due to underground 
blowout are explored.   In this scenario the potential of a deepwater underground blowout are 
accessed during drilling life phase of a deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico. A representative 
well and sand properties located in GoM in Popeye-Basin are selected to address the risk 
associated with underground blowouts.  
  
 
Figure 19: Underground blowout and its consequences 
 
For the underground blowout which results in recharging a low pressure zone, it is 
assumed that during drilling activity a depleted shallower zone connected to surface with a 
system of faults and fractures is accidently exposed to a high pressure deeper hydrocarbon zone. 
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These zones are connected through a conductive fault. The pressure of the deeper zone is high 
enough to activate the communicating fault and hydrocarbons migrate to depleted shallower 
zone. It is assumed that a system of exiting fractures in the upper zone is activated when its 
pressure reaches to the leak of test pressure value. The potential consequences in terms of fluid 
discharging to sea floor, subsidence occurrence and the probability of cratering are addressed in 
this study. Inside the wellbore, most sensitive point for formation breakdown is the casing shoe, 
but it can happen anywhere in the wellbore where formation is the weakest for that particular 
wellbore pressure. Due to only partial loss of pressure at the surface; it is difficult to determine if 
the underground blowout has occurred. 
 
4.1 Natural Hydrocarbon Seeps in GoM 
4.1.1 Geological Features 
Complexity of the northern GOM slope geology is a result of interplay of the sediments 
(Roberts H. Harry & Carney S. Robert, 1997). Acoustic wipe out zones have been identified, that 
are extending from subsurface to seafloor, confirming the evidence that the gas and oil migrated 
to the seafloor through these zones. The faults associated with deep salt bodies have greater 
potential to act as carrier of hydrocarbons to the sea floor than the faults at the lower depths 
above salt domes. It has been reported in the literature that some of the plays in the GoM, have 
sands that have pore pressures exceeding the least principle stress of overlying shale seals and 
creating new fractures or causing the old one to dilate and allowing fluid migration to upper 
layers, that sometimes leads to sea floor venting as well (Seldon, 2005). 
4.1.2 Popeye-Genesis Minibasin 
It has been reported in the literature that in Popeye-Genesis minibasin in the GoM, fluids 
from the reservoirs are venting to sea floor (Seldon, 2005). Due to rapid depositional rate, the 
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fluids are trapped and they contribute in supporting some of the overburden pressure. When the 
dipping over pressured permeable sands are contained by the low permeability shale, the 
pressure in sand has hydrostatic gradient whereas in the cap rock it commonly follows 
lithospheric gradient. Therefore at the crustal points, the sand pore pressure may become equal to 
or greater than the least principal stress. The excessive pressure may be responsible to open up 
the exiting cracks in the rock and allowing the reservoir fluids to escape.  
4.1.3 Auger Basin 
The Auger Basin lies 215 miles southwest of New Orleans in 3280 ft water depth. It has 
been reported that some of the reservoirs in the Auger basin are hydraulically connected over a 
distance of more than 12 miles (Reilly, 2010). Due to small overpressure gradients fluids in these 
reservoirs move upwards 1-20 mm/year.  
 
 
Figure 20: An example seismic map in northern GoM slope with source and migration pathways 
(From Hood et al., 2002) 
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Similar to the Popeye minibasin, the pore pressures at the crest of these reservoirs equal 
or exceed the minimum horizontal stress, and therefore fracturing the cap rock. This was 
confirmed with drilling a well in the crest of the reservoir, where they found that the pore 
pressure was equal to minimum horizontal stress as well as overburden stress (Reilly, 2010). On 
the seafloor above these reservoirs mud volcanic activity has been reported as well. There are 
other studies (Roger et al., 2003) that confirm that the hydrocarbons venting to sea floor in GoM 
are coming from deep hydrocarbons sources connected by a system of faults and fractures. It has 
been reported that alongside faults, the collapsed salt stocks may provide more effective 
migration pathways than faults when both of them are present (Hood et al., 2002). Source rock 
and several potential pathways are shown in Figure 20. 
4.1.4 Well stability concerns before Macondo shut in during blowout 
During the planning phase of Macondo shut in operations, one major concern was the 
potential leakage of the hydrocarbons at shallower depth due to burst of rupture disks, installed 
in 16” liner about 4493 ft below mud line, and new pathways that might be triggered as a result, 
Hickman et al. (2011). The Macondo well penetrated through poorly consolidated interbedded 
shale, silt and sandstone layers. In most of the GoM deepwater reservoirs, usually the pore 
pressure are very high, due to rapid deposition of very fine particles and this was the case with 
Macondo as well. The Macondo well was also geo pressured and the formation pressure in the 
Macondo well was only 600 psi less than the fracture pressure Hickman et al. (2011), therefore 
during drilling operation they had to deal with narrow drilling window.   
After the blowout BP’s Well Integrity Team (WIT) analyzed the worst possible scenarios 
after shut in. Then based on the regional geological features, BP’s team suggested that one of the 
worst case scenario would result  if burst disk located at 4493 ft below mudline, shown in Figure 
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21, are ruptured, than there is no physical barrier behind the liner to stop the escaping 
hydrocarbons. They also studied the possibility of creation of hydraulic fractures and found that, 
once the disks are ruptured, the geological settings in the vicinity of the well will allow the 
creation of hydraulic fractures and the hydrocarbons will migrate to the seafloor. 
 
Figure 21: Rupture disk location in Macondo well (From Hickman et al. (2011) 
 
4.2 Crater/Subsidence Hazard 
The probability of cratering as a result of underground blowout is greater provided that 
the blowout is shallower. It has been reported in literature that the possibility of flow coming to 
the surface outside of the casing is larger, if the blowout is within 3000-4000 ft depth (Grace, 
1994). The craters are more destructive when they occur in the vicinity of rigs. The primary 
mechanism working behind the crater creation is the subsidence of the formation. The reservoir 
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fluid pressure and the rock matrix support the weight of the overlying sediments. In the event of 
a shallow underground blowout, the fluid pressure in the producing formation may be reduced 
substantially and overburden is now mostly supported by the rock only, and the formation is 
compacted. The subsurface compaction may result in the subsidence, depending on the depth and 
extent of the reservoir. This type of phenomenon may cause large damage to the surface and 
subsurface facilities (Bruno, 1992). The subsidence has been observed during normal production 
operations as well.  
Case Histories for Crater/Subsidence: Few Examples are presented here to highlight 
the potential of crater formation of subsidence. 
Drilling Crater Case 1: During drilling a gas well, a large crater thought to be 600 ft 
deep, was created in Conroe Oil Field Texas, in 1933 when a gas well blow out caught fire and it 
destroyed the rig as well. 
 Drilling Crater Case 2: A large crater was created in Lake Peigneur in Louisiana that 
was nearly 1300 ft deep, the rig was destroyed. It was found later on that the drilling crew 
miscalculated their drilling position and drilled through salt dome and into a salt mine deep 
under the lake. The impact of the crater was such on a scale that another installation in the lake 
docks, another drilling platform, a 70 acre island in the middle of the lake, eleven barges, 
vehicles, trees and a parking lot near the lake were all sucked into the mine below. The pull of 
the whirlpool was so strong that it reversed the flow of the 12-mile-long Delcambre Canal that 
drained the lake into the Gulf of Mexico (Staci Lehman, 2014). 
Producing Field Case 1: Wilmington oil filed in California subsided nearly 33 ft during 
1935-65 period. This caused casing failures in hundreds of well and raising and repairing the 
facilities resulted in cost exceeding more $100 million, till 1962 (Bruno, 1992).  
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Producing Field Case 2:  In Vahal field which is located in the Norwegian sector of 
North Sea, at the time of discovery the reservoir pressure was only 494 psi less than the 
overburden stress of 7005 psi (Pattillo, 1998). During production a substantial subsidence 
occurred resulting in the failures of tubular in the reservoir and subsidence at the mudline. 
4.2.1 Conditions for Vertical Subsidence 
If the reservoir is approximated to be disk shaped, with thickness h, radius r and depth to 
the top of the reservoir as D. Then the simplified expression for the vertical subsidence reduces 
to (Bruno, 1992). 
 
max 𝑠𝑧 = 2𝐶𝑚(1 − 𝜈)∆𝑝 [ℎ − √𝑟2 + (𝐷 + ℎ)2 + √𝑟2 + 𝐷2    ] 
 
Where 𝜈 = Poisson’s ratio, Cm = uniaxial compaction coefficient and ∆p is uniform 
pressure drawdown. The uniaxial compaction coefficient is the ratio of change in strain to 
change in stress.   For elastic and isotropic materials, and assuming grain compressibility is small 
relative to bulk compressibility, the uniaxial compaction coefficient is related to the bulk 
compressibility through the expression, 




Where ρ is the bulk density and Vc is the compressional wave velocity for the rock. So it 
can be obtained from the well log analysis. 
4.3 Faults Barriers or Migratory Paths 
The sealing potential of a fault is attributed to the juxtaposed lithologies across fault and 
the presence or absence of seals resulting from the fault zone content and structure (Wiprut, 
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2002). It has been reported in literature that faults capable of slipping are permeable. These faults 
are critically stressed in the current stress field (Wiprut, 2002). Some of these faults were 
activated by massive sedimentation during periods of Plio-Pleistocene and salt movement also 
happened, resulting in providing avenues of vertical transport to the continental slope surface 
(Roberts, 1998). 
 
Figure 22: Pressure and Stresses in the Popeye-Genesis minibasin based on leak off test data 
[From Seldon, (2005)] 
 
Many of these faults cut thick sedimentary sequences that frequently contain geo 
pressured zones, so this combination of high potential drive and a fault serving as a pathway 
results in transport of hydrocarbons to sea floor. 
4.3.1 Cap Rock Failure 
It has been reported in literature that once the cap rock fails, its seal capacity may be 
reduced substantially sometimes up to 90 %, due to the development of highly connected 
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fracture network (Dewhurst et al., 2002). The scale of the reduction in differential stresses due to 
re-shearing is shown in Figure 23. It shows that the differential stress needed to deform the rock 




Figure 23: Stress and strain curves for original and re-sheared sandstones [From Dewhurst, 2002] 
 
Once the cap rock seal is broken, the rock failure now can occur due to tensile, shear and 
mixed mode fracturing. So the geomechanical tools used to predict the trap integrity under 
reactivation may under predict the seal risk due to the underlying assumption of cohesionless 
frictional failure (Dewhurst, 2002), as now rock can fail in other modes as well. The mechanics 
of fracturing process are influenced by grain strength and cataclasite morphology. Pore fluid 
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overpressure in some these sands equals or exceeds the least principal stress, and the fluid 
pressure is high enough to fracture the cap rock and drive the fluids vertically.  
4.3.2 Fault Permeability and Thickness 
The fault zone permeability can be empirically represented as a function of fault 
displacement and shale content (Manzocchi, 1999), by the flowing simplified expression 
log 𝑘𝑓 = −4𝑆𝐺𝑅 −
1
4
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐷)(1 − 𝑆𝐺𝑅)5                                (1) 
Where k is the fault permeability in mD, D = fault displacement in meters and SGR = 
Shale Gouge Ratio. The shale gouge ratio may vary from 1 to 0. This relationship does not 
provide a reliable estimate when SGR tends to zero. 





                                                  (2) 
The calculated values of the fault permeability and thickness are shown in Table 18, 
based on the assumption that fault movement resulted in displacement of 985 ft (300 m). 
 
Table 18: Calculated value of fault permeability and thickness 
Displacement (m) SGR Kf (mD) Thickness (ft) 
300 0.6 0.004 15 
 
 
Conditions for Hydraulic Fracture Formation  
 
Fractures exist in the earth crust at various scales and they contribute significantly in 
hydrology, engineering geology and petroleum engineering as well. When proper inflow 
conditions exist, these fractures may provide pathways for liquid flow, or may act like a barrier 
and prevent flow across itself.  In a study conducted by Cook et al., in 2008, it was pointed out 
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that natural gas hydrates present in   Keathley Canyon in GoM were controlled by presence of 
natural fractures. Natural oil and gas seeps are present in the Gulf of Mexico and other petroleum 
prolific regions of the world (Reilly et al., 2010). 
Stresses and Fracture opening and propagation 
In the porous media, the weight of the overburden is carried by both the grains and the 
pore fluid. Therefore, an effective stress, 𝜎𝑣
′  is defined as  
𝜎𝑣
′ = 𝜎𝑣 − 𝛼𝑝 
 
 Where  𝜎𝑣  = overburden stress, p   = pore pressure, α   = Biot’s poroelastic coefficient 
(ranges from 0 to 1) 








Due to the presence of tectonic forces, the horizontal stress varies with direction, and 
horizontal stresses can be related by 
𝜎𝐻,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝜎𝐻,𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝜎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐 
 
Usually the overburden stress is the largest amongst the three principal stresses and these 
can be expressed as  
𝜎𝑣 ≥ 𝜎𝐻 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝜎𝐻 𝑚𝑖𝑛 
 
The minimum horizontal stress can be found by the leakoff test, mini frac test and 
theoretically by using the following poroelasticity equation 
  Pressure to Fracture a Formation: The breakdown pressure required for a non-




𝑝𝑏𝑑 𝑛𝑝 = 3𝜎𝐻 𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝜎𝐻,𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑇𝑜 − 𝑝 
where 
Pbd,np = breakdown pressure for non-penetrating fluid 
To = tensile strength of rock 
 P = reservoir pressure 
The breakdown pressure for penetrating fluid is less than the pressure required for non-
penetrating fluid and is given by 
𝑝𝑏𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =




𝜂 =  
𝛼 (1 − 2𝜐)
2(1 − 𝜐)
 
The pressure required to propagate the fracture is usually less than the breakdown 
pressure.  
Fracture Permeability: Once fractures are created they can conduct at much higher rates 
than the reservoir sands. The ratio of fracture permeability to matrix permeability is an important 
parameter to consider when analyzing the fluid conductance through fractures. The fracture 









⁄ = 103 − 104  a transition occurs and the fracture start contributing to the 






⁄ = 105 − 106  main flow is carried by the well connected fractures and 
contribution of fracture permeability to the effective permeability of the reservoir becomes 
significant. 
Similar arguments can be made about the systems of faults connecting a high pressure deeper 
zone to a lower pressure shallower zone. If the permeability of this conductive zone is above a 
threshold value, than it can considerably conduct substantial hydrocarbons in short amount of 
time, otherwise it may take centuries to overcharge the shallower low pressure zone. 
Flow through Fracture: Fluid flow through fractures is usually modeled by the using 
the concept of two parallel plates. With the assumptions of laminar, incompressible fluid and 
smooth parallel plates, the Navier-Stokes equation reduces to commonly known cubic law for 
fracture flow. In reality most of the time, the natural fractures have rough walls and with walls 
coming to contact each other at some discrete points and reducing the amount of fluid moving 
through them (Klimczak, 2010). Therefore a model incorporating the roughness of walls and the 
crookedness of fluid path may be more representative of the true fluid flow in fractures. 
 
4.4 Reservoir Simulation Setup Flow through Faulted Zone 
The simulation model used for the analysis is shown below in Figure 24. It is a layered 
reservoir, divided into 15 layers. The bottom layer represents the source reservoir and the top 
most layer is the shallower low pressure zone. The intermediate layers have a fault that connects 
these two zones. An assumption is made that for intermediate layers only faulted region is 
conductive and fluid migrate through it to depleted top zone. The top most layer or low pressure 
zone has a set of faults and fracture that can transmit the fluids to the sea floor, provided that the 
necessary conditions of pressure are met to open up the fractures or reactivation of faults. These 
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onset conditions are met when it is recharged to its leak off test value. The simulation time starts 
on 01-01-2013 and the reservoir properties of the shallower and deep zones are shown in Figure 
24. The deeper zone is 10500 ft long, 10015 ft wide and 106 ft thick. 
 
Table 19: Reservoir properties of shallower low pressure and deeper high pressure zone 




Depth Below Mudline (ft) 14052 8772 
Porosity 0.23 0.23 
Permeability (mD) 246 246 
Thickness (ft) 106 106 
Sw 0.2 0.8 
Initial Pressure (psi) 11302 4332 
 
Parametric Study: The parametric variations, for the flow through fault connecting the 
two zones are shown in Table 20. The faulted zone’s conductance and the ratio of volume of the 
shallower to deeper zones are varied. 
 
Table 20: Underground blowout cases study flow through a fault 
Case # Ratio of Depleted zone 




1 1 0.004 
2 1 4 
3 1 40 
4 0.1 40 
5 0.01 40 
 
The reservoir model only showing the zones that contribute to flow are shown in Figure 
24. The lower zone is at an approximate depth of 14,000 ft, while the shallower zone lies at a 
depth of 8,700 ft. These depths are extracted from Figure 22, corresponding to the leak off data 
available and are total vertical depths from Kelly bushing. 
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Figure 24: Reservoir simulation model, showing the two interconnecting zones and conductive 
fault used for studying Underground Blowout 
 
Minimum Horizontal Stress from Leak off Tests 
The leakoff data for a well in the Popeye filed is shown in Table 21. This data is used for 
the example calculation of rock stresses using the reservoir simulation Model.  
 











117-A4 4265 2755 2871 116 0.96 
117-A4 6331 4466 4742 276 0.94 
117-A4 7615 5699 5945 246 0.96 
117-A4 9528 7439 7772 333 0.96 
 
It is hypothesized that when the shallower zone is charged to its leak off pressure value, it 
will transmit the hydrocarbons to the sea floor. As the shallower zone is already fractured, 







some of the instances the shallower zone’s pressure is in equilibrium with the least principal 
stresses and only a small perturbation will lead to transmit the hydrocarbons to the sea floor. 
4.5 Simulation Results flow through Faulted Zone 
Case 1: The results for this case are shown in Figure 25. With the use of estimated value 
of fault zone permeability, hundreds of years are required when the pressure of the higher deeper 
zone will even be felt by the shallower lower. It may sound shot period of time on the geological 
scale, but in this study, focus is to highlight the conditions that will result in quick recharging of 
the shallower zone. So the simulation was terminated after 100 years’ time frame. 
 
Figure 25: Pressure change propagation after 100 years of flow from high pressure to lower 
pressure shallower zone 
 
Case 2: In this case the permeability or transmissibility of the fault zone connecting the 
deeper and shallower zones is increased to one thousand times the estimated value. In this case e 
both zones have same volume. The pressure in the depleted zones is monitored to see whether it 
reaches the onset conditions for fracturing or not. During the first 100 years the high pressure of 
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the deeper zone is even not felt by the shallower low pressure zone shown in the Figure 26, so 
the simulation was terminated after 100 years, in this case as well.  
 
Figure 26: Pressure change propagation after 100 years of flow from high pressure to lower 
pressure shallower zone 
 Case 3: In this case the permeability of the connecting zone was increased to 10,000 
times the original estimated fault permeability. In this case after 135 years the conditions 
corresponding to leak off test value of 7439 psi were reached and upper zone will transmit fluid 
to the sea floor. 
 




Case 4: In this case the upper zone volume is reduced to 1/10 of the original volume; all 
other parameters remain the same as were in the case 3. In this case 24.5 years are needed to 
achieve the conditions in the shallower zone to transmit the fluid to the sea floor, under the 
assumption that once conditions equivalent to leak off test are reached, hydrocarbons can migrate 
to sea floor. 
  
Figure 28: Pressure contour of the deeper and shallower zone and the pressure change with time 
 
Case 5: In this case the shallower zones volume is taken to be one hundredth of the 
original volume. Due to small volume of the target zone, the conditions for onset of the 
fracturing are achieved in less than 4 years’ time frame only, shown in Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29: Shallower zones pressure variations with time for Case- 5. Fracture 
dilation/propagation conditions are met in 3 years’ time frame 
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4.6 Observations & Conclusions 
 The consequences of an underground blowout range from no visible damage at the sea 
surface to the loss of the whole rig. It is difficult to quantitatively estimate the risk due to 
the involvement of large number of uncertain parameters.  
 The potential of hydrocarbons leaking to sea floor is a combination of geological settings, 
the transmissibility of the paths allowing hydrocarbons to reach sea floor, the pressure of 
source reservoir and its potential to create fractures in the low lying geological barriers.  
 The formulas used to estimate the fault permeability and thickness are very simple and 
uncertainty exits in the estimated parameters of fault permeability and its thickness. 
 The simulation results show that for low permeability k=0.004 mD fault connecting a deep 
over pressured zone to a shallower low pressure zone, the time taken to recharge the 
shallower zone to reach its LOT pressure value is more than 100 years. 
 A high permeable faulted zone of 40 mD will take 135 years to recharge the low pressure 
shallower zone to its LOT pressure value. 
 In the reservoir model adopted  in this scenario, when the ratio of the volume of shallower 
to deeper zone decrease to 0.1, the recharging time significantly drops to 24 years only. 
Therefore ratio of the two zones is also an important parameter alongside their pressure 
differential and the transmissibility of the connecting zone.   
 The worst conditions may occur when the hydrocarbons travel through the casing-wellbore 
annulus and may either reach to shallowest zones lying very close to mud line or leak 
outside of the well. The casing-wellbore annulus path may have very high permeability due 
to fractured cement and/or due to micro annulus gaps in this path. In this case the 
hydrocarbons may appear at the sea floor during the drilling activity. 
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CHAPTER 5: OIL SPILL RISK ASSESSMENT OF A SAND CONTROL ELEMENT 
FAILURE LEADING TO BLOWOUT DURING NORMAL PRODUCTION 
OPERATIONS (SCENARIO-3) 
 
A great effort is under way after Macondo incident to improve the safety of deepwater 
drilling and production operations and enhance the capabilities of different well barrier to stop 
the oil spill on its earliest stages. This study is a part of that collective effort to make offshore 
operations safer and decrease the associated risks. The main objective of modeling this scenario 
was to investigate the oil spill risk associated with a representative production well in the Gulf of 
Mexico during its normal production operations. Identification of most critical elements 
contribution to risk assessment in a subsea production well was also among the objectives. 
Quantified risk is computed from the product of blowout and volume of oil released to the 
environment as a result. Blowout frequency is computed from Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
spilled oil volume is estimated from simulating multiphase fluid flow and heat transfer in 
wellbores. 
 Most of the oil wells are completed with some sort of bottom hole sand control elements 
to prevent production of sand, when hydrocarbons are produced. The failure of these control 
elements may have severe consequence and in some cases may result in uncontrolled 
hydrocarbon flowing to the environment. A representative production well from the Mississippi 
Canyon in the Gulf of Mexico is selected for the for quantitative risk assessment (QRA) analysis. 
The well is completed with cased hole gravel pack and with sand control elements in place. The 
representative reservoir properties for this well are selected from the literature and variations in 
properties are accounted for by fitting lognormal distribution. Monte Carlo simulations were 
performed to find distribution of productivity index. P50 value for the reservoir properties 
distributions and PI from Monte Carlo simulation was used to find worst case discharge rates by 
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using a commercially available multiphase flow simulators OLGA and PIPESIM with black oil 
fluid model. 
A Fault Tree is constructed using LOGAN fault tree analysis software, to find the 
blowout probability based on the primary and secondary barrier failure data. From the minimal 
cut set method the importance and sensitivity of different well barrier is analyzed and most 
critical well barriers are identified.  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 Quantitative risk assessment provides means to conduct systematic analysis of risk due 
to hazard activities and evaluation of various risks reducing measure (Spouge, 1999). Risk to an 
offshore installation may be expressed into the main categories of risks posed to human life, 
assets, production delay and environment. These are sometimes called “dimensions of risk” 
(Vinnem, 2007). Environmental risk/damage is analyzed in this study in the form of amount of 
hydrocarbons released to the environment.  
Well Barriers: In order to prevent a blowout, the well must be equipped with pressure 
control equipment and barriers. As regulatory requirement in all well operations, two tested and 
independent well barriers should be in place at all times for abnormally pressured formations 
with flow potential NORSOK Standard (2013). Each barrier in itself is intended to prevent 
uncontrolled flow of the reservoir fluid to the surroundings. In the production life phase of an 
offshore well, the primary barriers are production tubing, SCSSV and production packer, while 
the main secondary barriers are Subsea production Tree, wellhead, tubing hanger, casing and 
cement behind the casing, these are shown in Figure 30, below.  A blowout can only occur when 





Figure 30: Schematic of a horizontal subsea tree (From NORSOK standard D-010, 2013) 
 
Consequences and Risk Analysis: An average production life span of 30 years can be 
assumed for modeling the risk associated with entire life phase of a deepwater well. In this study 
to model the worst case discharge rates, only initial life span of a newly completed production 
well is considered when the well has its maximum potential to flow.  Any other spill at some 
later part of the production well will be less severe. Therefore the analysis presented here may be 
regarded as a very conservative case, portraying the maximum risk associated with a deepwater 
production well.   
 
5.2 Literature Survey 
 
The reliability of some of the primary and secondary barriers of a production well are is 
analyzed in some of the earlier studies. Capderou and Dilorenzo (2012) studied the reliability of 
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completions equipment related to sand control and concluded that a clear distinction can be made 
between Open Hole Gravel Pack and expandable sand screen completions. Vandenbussche et al. 
(2012) presented the technique to conduct a well specific assessment and suggested that the risk 
assessment entirely based on historical data may be very conservative unless it is adjusted with 
current improvements in terms of technology and operations. Worth et al. (2008) conducted the 
comparative risk assessment of steam assisted gravity drainage of wells with isolated (double 
barrier) completion and an open (single barrier) completion. They concluded that both injection 
and  production wells have the potential to create a large spills for a significant amount of time, 
and that the life time risk of a producing well are mainly related to normal production operations. 
Woodyard (1982) conducted a risk analysis of a well completion system and compared different 
completions and concluded that the equipment reliability is changed if workover operations were 
included in the reliability calculations. Wagg et al., in 2008 studied the reliability of Sand 
Control Completion (SCC) systems and presented an approach for systematics data collection 
and usage. They concluded that to reduce the uncertainty in data, the data should be extracted 
from some main source having a large data set. Lucija et al. (2011) conducted an assessment of 
offshore production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and through statistical analysis found that 
the incidents reported increases with water depth, age of platform, quantity of oil and gas 
produced and number of producing wells on those platforms. They observed that for each 100 ft 
of added depth increase, the probability of company-reported incident increase by 8.5 percent.  
 
5.3 Methodology 
Consequences of blowouts may vary and depends upon a number of factors, including 
but not limited to its location, water depth, reservoir’s flowing potential, duration of blowout and 
restrictions in the fluid path. Therefore each blowout may result in different set of consequences.   
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Sand Control Element (Screen) Failures: The two main failure mechanisms identified 
in literature for sand screens (King, 2003), are during their installation and failure during the 
normal production operations. Sand control element failure data is shown in Table 22.  
 














61 366 0.068 
Sc een Only 
Completion 
194 766 0.055 
ased Hole Gravel 
Pack 
387 1664 0.012 
Open Hole Gravel 
Pack 
208 613 0.016 
High Rate Water 
Packs 
187 556 0.009 
Frac Pack 842 3351 0.005  
 
The main causes of sand screen failure during normal production operations are shown 
above. Design flaw is one of the major failure mechanisms, shown by the design and infant 
failures as well. The influx of hydrocarbons for production wells of influx of fluids injected in 
secondary or tertiary recovery is also a major failure category followed by failure due to 
formation compaction effects. The unknown failures reported in literature also share a large 
portion, and warrants further investigation to identify the root causes of these failures, so that 
future design and installation procedure can take care of these failures as well.  
5.4 Primary Well Barrier Failure Analysis 
 
Production Packer: Permanent production packer once set provides a seal for the 
tubing-casing annulus at the bottom of the tubing and holds the tubing in place.  It also facilitate 
in keeping the completion fluid inside the tubing-casing annulus. The main modes of packer 
failure are tensile failure, body collapse and packing element failure. 
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Tubing: The tubing failures during normal production operation is mostly attributed to 
external  loads causing damage, followed by corrosion failure as shown in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31: Major tubing failure causes and their contribution King et al. (2010) 
 
Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV): SCSSV is one of the critical 
primary barriers during production operations and it proved very useful in shutting the wells in 
the GoM, during hurricane Katrina, Rita and Gustave. Busch (1985) concluded in his study about 
reliability of the SCSSV, that blowout risk can be substantially reduced by including the SCSSV 
in the system. Molnes et al. (2000) reported that reliability of SCSSV has been significantly 
improved over the years from 1983-1999. The data for primary barrier failure rates is 
summarized in Table 23. The failure rate of tubing or other pipelines is usually expressed as 
failure per/ mile-year and by using the well depth, it was converted to failure per production well 
year. 
Table 23: Primary barrier failure rates 
Element 
Failure rate 
(per prod year) 
Production Packer  
(King, 2010) 
0.001656 
Tubing (King, 2010) 0.001505 
 
SCSSV (OREDA –Handbook 2009, 







5.5 Secondary Well Barrier Failure Analysis 
Secondary barrier failure data has been obtained from different sources, OREDA 
Handbook-2009 and SINTEF reports available in public domain are two of the main sources. 
The data is given in Table 24, below. The subsea tree, tubing hanger and wellhead data is 
extracted from OREDA-2009 Handbook, this data is consists of offshore reliability data upto 
2001.  
Table 24: Secondary barrier failure rates 
Element Failure rate 
(per prod 
year) 
Tree  (OREDA-Handbook-2009) Mechanical 0.014542 
Control 0.0461 
Wellhead (OREDA-Handbook-2009) Mechanical 0.002278 
Tubing Hanger (OREDA-Handbook-2009) 0.002716 
Casing (Holand, 1997) 0.005817 
Cement (Holand, 1997) 0.007393 
 
 
Blowout Frequency: According to OGP (2010, Report No. 434-2), a blowout is defined 
as an incident where formation fluids, flows out of the well or between formation layers after all 
the predefined technical well barriers or the activations of the same have failed. The historical 
blow out frequencies for the normal production operations, excluding workover and wireline 
operations for world regions other than North Sea (which mostly consist of Gulf of Mexico) are 
shown in Table 25. Blowout  frequency/probability  assessment  is  one  of  the  main  activity  in  
quantifying  the  risk  related  to production well operations. Due to technological and 
operational advances in the recent past, the blowout probability might be considerably reduced in 
recent years, compared to the historical trends. While due to the variation in different production 
systems, the probability also varies greatly from well to well. 
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Table 25: Blowout probability during normal production operations OGP (2010) 
Category Frequency  (per well year)  
Blowout (surface flow) 3.30E-05 
Blowout (underground flow) 4.70E-06 
Diverted well release 0 
Well release 9.50E-06 
 
Blowout Duration: Blowout duration is a function of the success of different well 
control procedures. It depends on the condition of blowing well, the rate at which hydrocarbons 
are released, its location and access to the well for different response systems to work, 
availability of rigs in the region and time taken to activate the response resources. Capping and 
containment systems are mostly equipped with a set of transition spools that allow them to 
connect to various standard connectors. These modifications allow them to connect to a variety 
of subsea productions trees. 
 
Table 26: Blowout duration probability distribution adopted from ACONA (2012) 















7 15 30 90 
Probability Subsea 
Capping Stack 
0 0.6 0.3 0.1 
 
A deepwater blowing well can be put under control by crew intervention, successful 
deployment of capping stack or drilling a relief well. Smith (2012), based on historic blowout 
data in the GOM, pointed out that probability of a well to kill by itself (bridging) in deepwater is 
very low in comparison to shallow well, most probably due to consolidation of the sands in 
deeper waters. Typical blowout duration for a deepwater well is shown in Table 26. 
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Flow Path Distribution and Restrictions to Flow: The path taken by the reservoir fluid 
and restrictions in its path are important when calculating the WCD rate for that particular 
situation. There are a number of flow paths possible for the reservoir fluids to come to surface 
(Peterson, 2011 & Smith, 2012), shown in Figure 32. The oil discharging to the environment 
could be at the platform or at sea floor. The path taken by the flowing hydrocarbon could be 
through production tubing, tubing-casing annulus or through the rock/cement outside the casing. 
This amount of oil discharging to the environment will depend on the restrictions it has to face to 
reach the sea floor or sea surface.  In this study only flow through the tubing and tubing-casing 
annulus are modeled. Flow through tubing can only happen, when after the failure of sand 
control element, SCSSV fails along with tree, but annular flow is prevented as the packer is 
sealing the annulus at the bottom of the string and is intact.  
 
Figure 32: Possible flow paths [From Petersen (2011)] 
 
Flow through casing-tubing annulus happens when the packer and set of annular vales 
fails to stop the flow after sand control element failure. The flow outside the casing and inside 
the rock may conservatively be taken as equivalent to the flow inside the tubing, although in 
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reality it may be a fraction of that amount. The case of flow through rock is addressed in chapter-
4 related to underground blowouts. 
5.6 Analysis Setup 
A commercially available steady state multiphase fluid flow simulator PipeSim, with 
black oil composition model was used to estimate the worst case discharge rates with different 
set of parametric variations.  For heat transfer estimation a linear geothermal gradient was 
assumed with surrounding temperature around 40F
o
 at mud line and it leanly increase to 210F
o
 
when reservoir depth is reached (a crude assumption, because temperature first decreases and 
then increases as we go below the mud line). The specific gravities of oil, gas and water were 
taken to be 0.86, 0.67 and 1 respectively. The viscosity was modeled using Vasquez & Beggs 
correlation. The roughness of wellbore and casing and drill pipe was assumed to be equivalent of 
a steel pipe with value of 0.001 inches. Based on different casing and annular settings, the overall 
heat transfer coefficient was taken as 2 Btu/hr/ft
2
. The pressure at the fluid outlet at seabed is 
fixed to be 1395 psi based on the average sea water gradient of 0.465 psi/ft (for saline water, 
usually used for GOM) for a water depth of 3000 ft. 
 
5.7 Results and Discussion 
5.7.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
The results for the Fault Tree Analysis for a deepwater production well are shown in 
Figure 33. The high failure rate of primary barrier is mainly due to SCSSV’s control system’s 
failure. The delayed response to a potential hazardous event is another area of concern and is one 
of the main contributors to primary barrier failure frequency. A careful observation of the 
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Figure 33: Production fault tree analysis setup 
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5.7.2 Fussell Vesely Importance (FVI) Measure 
The manner in which fault tree was constructed, three basic events of the fault tree 
namely sand screen failure, subsea tree main control system failure and delayed response to an 
event of immediate attention are the most importance basic events. As FVI is based on minimal 
cut seta method, therefore cut sets containing these events have the highest probability to occur 
as well. FVI measures of all of the basic events in the fault tree are shown in Table 27.  Analysis 
shows that blowout probability is most sensitive to sand screen failure and any improvement in 
the design of sand screen will greatly reduce the overall blowout probability.  
 
Table 27: Fussell Vesely importance analysis results 
Event Name Sensitivity 
SANDCONT (sand control element) 1.00E+00 
OTHERS 1.00E+00 
TREEELEC (Tree control system) 6.07E-01 
SCSSV-EL (SCSSV control) 3.76E-01 
TUBING 3.70E-01 
SCSSV-ME (SCSSV Mechanical) 2.44E-01 
TREEMECH (Tree mechanical) 1.91E-01 
CEMENT 9.72E-02 
CASING 3.93E-02 





The next main important basic event that can substantially reduce the blowout probability 
is main control system of a subsea tree; it is to be pointed out here that in most of the instances 
theses control systems has backup redundant system, that automatically takes over in the case of 
failure of first one. Delayed response of personnel, supposed to decide quickly and take an action 
in the emergency situation, is the next item to focus on, in order to reduce blowout frequency. 
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These three main contributors may be dealt with the technological advancements.  Sand screen’s 
design is one of the major failure causes mentioned earlier on, therefore design improvements in 
terms of improving the reliability of these elements will greatly reduce the blowout probability.  
Delay in the response to an event of immediate concern can be coped with automating some of 
the initial response decisions and through overseeing the operations by remotely monitoring the 
operations and take quick decision and guide the personnel on the production platform. Better 
training of the personnel. 
 
5.7.3 Blowout Uncertainty Analysis 
 Monte Carlo Simulations were performed to measure the uncertainty associated with the 







respectively, and are shown in Figure 34, below.  
 
 
Figure 34: Blowout uncertainty with a nearly normal distribution 
 
The mode of the frequency is around 1.7×10
-5 
blowouts per well year. As the distribution 
is near normal, so average and mode value are supposed to be very close to each other. 
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5.7.4 Flow Rate Calculations 
The subsea release flow rates obtained for reservoir properties corresponding to P50 
value from cumulative frequency distribution are shown in Table 28. The basic assumption for 
flow rate calculation is that the well is a new production well, and reservoir pressure has not 
decreased greatly.  
Table 28: Subsea release paths and rates, SST: Subsurface Release through Tubing, SSA: 
Subsea Release through Annulus, FSP: Flow Restriction Probability, PPB: Probability Per 
Blowout 








SST1 Open 0.1 34546 0.063 
SST2 Restricted 0.9 21121 0.567 
Annulus 0.25 
SSA1 Open 0.1 32644 0.025 
SSA2 Restricted 0.9 20056 0.225 
Outside Casing 0.12 SSR NA 1 21121 0.12 
 
 
It has been assumed that, when actuated both of the SCSSV and ASV will result in 
restricting the flow 90% of the time. Therefore a probability of 0.9 is assigned for the restricted 
condition and 0.1 when these valves fails completely and do not offer any resistance the flowing 
hydrocarbons. The restriction to the flow is described in terms of the flow area open to flow and 
it is based on literature available a flow restriction of 95% is assumed. Flow in the annulus 
presented in the Table 28, is the scenario when packer failed but still offer some resistance to 
flow and some portion of annular area is open to flow.  
 
5.7.5 Environmental Risk Assessment 
Environmental risk associated with a blowout, depends on flow rate, location and 
duration of spill. The flow rate is related to the well’s potential to flow and how much resistance 
fluid faces when flowing either in tubing or annulus and the conditions of different production 
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valve of a subsea tree.  Maximum duration of a typical blowout is assumed to be 90 days i.e. 
time taken to drill a relief well in the deep waters of GoM. In most of the cases the well may 
come under control well before this period either through crew intervention or some other 
response system intervention. The probability of a spill duration of 90 days is 10% only as 
shown in Table 26. The assumption of 90 days duration and unrestricted open hole flow result in 
the most conservative worst case environmental damage. Calculated impact factor for different 
flowing conditions for the base and modified cases are shown in Table 29. The duration for the 
base, modified and ideal cases are 90, 27 and 15 days respectively.  
In this analysis above mentioned three cases are compared to each other. Base case is the 
worst case scenario, when every intervention attempt to stop the flow fails.  
Table 29: Impact Factor Calculation for Base and Modified Cases 
Scenario Case ID PPWY Cumulative Oil 
Volume  (bbls) 
Impact 
Factor   




BC1 9.89E-07 3.11E+06 4 
BC2 8.90E-06 1.90E+06 4 
BC3 3.93E-07 2.94E+06 4 
BC4 3.53E-06 1.81E+06 4 







MC1 9.89E-07 9.33E+05 4 
MC2 8.90E-06 5.70E+05 3 
MC3 3.93E-07 8.81E+05 4 
MC4 3.53E-06 5.42E+05 3 







MIC1 9.89E-07 5.18E+05 3 
MIC2 8.90E-06 3.17E+05 2 
MIC3 3.93E-07 4.90E+05 3 
MIC4 3.53E-06 3.01E+05 2 
MIC5 1.88E-06 3.17E+05 2 
 
 
In this case the spill duration of 90 days is considered, which is equal to the time of drilling a 
relief well to stop the blowing well in the deepwater GoM environment. In the modified case the 
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recently built spill response systems called Capping Stacks are taken into consideration with 
possibility of some delays in its deployment phase which reduces the duration from 90 to 27 days 
only.  In the modified ideal case it is assumed that the capping stack can be successfully 
deployed within the 15 days’ time frame. These capping stack are designed to be deployed within 
15 days’ time frame, therefore it is not a crude assumption. These capping and containment 
systems are basically designed for drilling activities and to be deployed on exiting BOP’s or 
Wellheads, having standard H-4 Hydraulic connectors. These systems are equipped with a set of 
adopter spools and may be latched to a variety of standard connectors at subsea trees. The impact 
factor of all of these cases is shown in Table 29. 
The above mentioned three cases are compared to each other by using a risk matrix and 
are shown in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35: Comparison of all three cases through risk matrix 
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The entire base subcases results in the category of serious impact, but due to their very 
low frequency of occurrences, when an overall risk is computed through the product of 
probability and consequences, their risk level fall in the yellow region, in which operations are 
conducted with extra safety precautions. The use of the capping stack significantly altered the 
impact of large spill, by reducing the spill duration and as a result less volume is released to the 
environment. The modified ideal case is the case when capping stack is successfully deployed 
within the 15 days intended response time, and as a result it shifts the impact from significant to 
moderate. This analysis shows the significant contributions that technological improvements can 
bring in order to reduce large oil spills in the GoM.   
There have been technological improvements in other area of production systems as well, 
that may result in further reducing the frequency of primary and secondary barrier failure rates. 
 
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks for Scenario-3 
 The QRA study of a deepwater production well has been performed and key contributors 
to overall system safety have been identified through fault tree analysis. 
 Sensitivity analysis of all of the basic events in the constructed Fault Tree for a sand 
screen failure leading to blowout was conducted. It turned out to that the three most 
important basic events contributing to the frequency of blowout are sand screen failures, 
subsea production tree’s control system failure and well control/other failures. 
 It has been suggested by other researchers that the design improvements of the sand screen 
will greatly reduce their failure rates and in turn blowout frequency associated with 
production well, as it is one of the most sensitive/important basic event in the system 
setup, considered for this scenario. 
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 Subsea production tree’s control system is the second most important basic event in the 
system, and even a small improvement in the reliability of control system will greatly 
influence the blowout frequency of the entire system. 
 Monte Carlo simulation results for blowout probability show a range of values between 
1.54-2.0 ×10
-5
 per well-year, when each of the basic events is varied by ±10%. 
 A WCD rate of 34,546 BOPD was estimated using multiphase fluid simulations and it is 
well within the fluid handling capacity of newly built response systems called capping and 
containment systems. Newly built response systems are effective in reducing the risk of 
large oil spill in deepwater environments. Additional tools like adopter spools may be 
needed to connect capping stack to subsea trees with different connector profiles. 
 The blowout frequency modeled by FTA is based on the historical data and therefore it is a 
conservative estimate. When recent technological improvements are incorporated into 
FTA, the blowout frequency will be reduced, as in the past few years there have been 
major improvements in well safety related procedures. New regulatory requirements, 
equipment reliability improvements and extensive training of crew, all of these will 









CHAPTER 6: A REVIEW OF OIL SPILL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH FPSO 
DEPLOYMENT IN GOM (SCENARIO-4) 
 
FPSO stands for Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessels. They are essentially 
ship-shaped vessels; either specially built or converted tankers. They produce, store and transport 
hydrocarbons to either shuttle tankers or deepwater pipeline terminals. The main advantages of 
FPSO as compared to other offshore platforms are 
 They allow production far deeper than fixed platforms. Most of the FPSO’s have been 
deployed to deepwater fields, as they are nearly water depth insensitive as compared to other 
offshore production platforms. 
 They allow development of short-lived, marginal fields in remote locations where fixed 
platform are not feasible economically. 
 They can process large amount of hydrocarbons and have huge storage capacity as well, and 
the processed fluids are usually transported by shuttle tankers. 
 They eliminate the need of cost associated with long pipelines to onshore terminals, 
especially in ultra-deepwater where seabed pipelines are not cost effective. 
 They are particularly effective in remote deepwater. 
 They can be relocated to new locations and reused easily. 
In terms of spill potential the following capabilities of the FPSO are different than other 
offshore platforms  
1. Station Keeping and buoyancy 
2. Shuttle tanker Transport 




Figure 36: FPSO in operation (From http://www.bluewater.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/4.2.3-Subsea-Field-Layout.jpg) 
  
6.1 Typical FPSO Configuration for GoM 
The proposed configuration details of a typical FPSO for GoM taken from Regg (2000), 
are shown in Table 30. A base case and a configuration for analyzing the system’s performance is 
also specified by Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and is given in  Regg (2000).  
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Table 30: FPSO configuration for GOM deployment from (Regg et al., 2000) 
Component  Base Case Characterization  Sensitivity Case Characterization 
Size Up to 150,000 dwt tons Up to 500,000 deadweight tons 
Hull Design Double-sided/double-bottom Single hull variations — double-
sided/single-bottom; no storage in wing 
tanks; hydrostatic loading; single-sided 
other than ship-shaped hull 
Storage 500,000 to 1 million bbls of 
crude 
Up to 2.3 million bbls of crude 
Processing Oil — up to 150,000  
BPD Gas — up 200 million 
CFGPD  
Water — up 70,000 BPD 
Oil — up to 300,000 BPD  
Gas — up 300 million CFGPD 
Water — up 100,000 BPD 





500,000-bbl capacity each; 
GOM operations; not 
dynamically positioned 
Dynamically positioned 
Gas Transfer Gas sales line to shore or 
existing infrastructure 
Reinjection for later recovery; possible 
gas to liquids conversion 
Mooring Permanent — up to 12 lines, 
most likely anchored by 
suction piles 
Disconnectable; may be dynamically 
positioned 
Propulsion None; may have thruster 
assist for certain mooring 
arrangements 
Self-propelled; capable of drive-off 
Turret Internal turret; multi-path 
swivel 
  
Risers <3,000 ft water - flexible pipe 
>3,000 ft water - steel 
catenary riser(s), free standing 
riser (for example, GB 388) or 
other hybrid system 
  






The data used in this scenario is adopted from sensitivity case characterization 
configuration given in Table 30. The risk associated with the deployment of FPSO are 
comparable to other production facilities with some added concerns about the station keeping, 
large storage capacity and collision with shuttle tanker. Gilbert et al. (2001), conducted the 
comparative analysis of FPSO with other deepwater developments and concluded that the oil 
spill and other associated risk with FPSO are comparable to other facilities and major 
contribution of spill may be due to transportation of oil using shuttle tankers. Spill sources would 
be the same as for other production facilities: process train (separators, piping, small volume 
storage tanks), pipelines, and riser/wellbore.  The large volume storage associated with an FPSO, 
transfer operations (from FPSO or other loading facility to the shuttle tanker), and shuttle tanker 
transport are areas that differ from typical GOM developments (platforms, subsea, other FPS’s). 
A quantitative risk assessment study conducted by Overfield et al., (2000) for FPSO safety, 
points out that the main risk to the personnel is dominated by fires, explosions and cargo tank 
explosion. While assets risk are posed by the collision of shuttle tanker, riser leaks, subsea 
pipeline damage and turret operations. The focus of the study is the impact analysis of the 
following factors specific to FPSO. 
 Station Keeping FPSO 
 Transportation Spill Analysis 
 Large Storage Capacity of FPSO 
These are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
6.2 Station Keeping 
Position/station keeping is one of the main differences between FPSO and offshore 
production platform types, due to FPSO’s dynamic positioning system. Two options exist for 
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FPSO station keeping - the majority of existing FPSO’s employ a fixed mooring system using 
anchors and anchor lines; a few rely on dynamically positioned systems that employ a series of 
thrusters and positioning technology.  
6.2.1 Mooring Configurations 
There are two main mooring configurations for FPSO: spread mooring in which vessel 
keeps its orientation fixed and a single point mooring in which the vessel have the freedom to 
reorient itself to accommodate the weather conditions. One of the variant of single point mooring 
is the turret mooring, which could be a part of the vessel or externally connected to a FPSO. 
Spread and single point mooring are shown in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: (a) Spread mooring and (b) Single point turret mooring [Reference: 
energyclaims http://www.energyclaims.net/assets/FPSO-Presentation.pdf) 
 
The turret mooring system allows the FPSO to adjust its position, to accommodate the 
environmental loads. The factors that influence mooring systems are the combination of wave 
height, directions of wind and current and vessel size. Riser system should also be analyzed 
while studying mooring system (Regg-2000). Duggal et al., (2009) studied numerically and 
experimentally the station keeping of FPSO in harsh weather conditions for 100 year sea 




for the actual FPSO in severe weather conditions showed that these systems performed reliably 
in severe weather conditions to disconnect and connect back to subsea installations.  
6.2.2 FPSO Roll motion effect on Mooring 
 It has been reported that hulls of FPSO have been exposed to excessive roll motion up to 
20 degrees amplitude (Kinnas, 2005). This excessive motion may result in damaging the 
mooring lines and halting the operations as well. The solution to this problem has been suggested 
by Kinnas (2005) as to install of bilge keels on these hulls.  
6.2.3 FPSO Yawing Motion 
 In a study conducted by Kim (2004), a coupled vessel-riser-mooring dynamic system 
was analyzed experimentally. A scaled down model on a 1:60 Scale was used. It was concluded 
that when mooring dynamic effects are significant, the dynamic mooring tension can be under 
predicted with truncated mooring system. Rocha et al., in 2010 performed and FEMCA analysis 
of different systems contributing in maintaining the balance of FPSO in the case of an 
emergency situation.  They pointed out that amongst the systems they selected for the study, 
Safety Interlock and Automation System (SAIS) was the least reliable systems and they 
recommended the design re-evaluation if possible for SAIS.  Holdbrook in 2004 conducted a risk 
based assessment of hull structure and pointed out that the cracking probability of hull structure 
for FPSO may be higher as compared to fixed offshore structures, as there are more stresses 
concentrating feature in a typical FPSO hull. A major factor for these cracks may be stresses 
caused by improper loading and unloading sequence (OGP-Report # 377). 
6.3 Fuel Offloading Operations 
Most of the FPSOs offload the hydrocarbons to shuttle tankers directly. The direct 
transport is usually achieved through tandem offloading or side by side offloading. The tandem 
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offloading is considered to be safe. The tandem and side by side off loadings from FPSO to a 
shuttle tanker are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 38: (a) Tandem and (b) side by side offloading from FPSO (From Regg-2000) 
 
The sequence of events that is followed in the tandem offloading is described by Chen 
(2003) as following 
 Approach and Connection: Tanker approaches FPSO and stops at predefined distance and 
a connection is established between FPSO and tanker to transfer oil 
 Loading, disconnection and departure: Oil is transferred to tanker and loading hose and 
hawser are disengaged and tanker departs away 
6.4 Shuttle Tanker Collision Analysis 
Shuttle tankers or other supply vessels coming to the FPSO, in the normal weather 
conditions may have three modes of collision with the FPSO (Lloyd’s Register, 2014). 




 Standby Position 
 During loading  
Each mode has its own related collision frequency and collision energy depending on a number 
of factors being involved 
During Arrival 
𝑓𝑐 = 𝑁 × 𝑓                                                                          (1) 
𝐸 = 0.3685 × 𝑚 × (1 + 𝑎) × 𝑣2                                        (2) 
Where: 
 𝑓𝑐    =   is the collision frequency per year  
N =  number of arrivals per year  
f = collision frequency (per arrival or visit) 
v = velocity of vessel when powered (f/s) 
m = mass of vessel (lb) 
E = collision energy (ft-lbf) 
a = 0.1, added mas factor for water displacement as it is supposed to be ahead on 
collision,  
 Standby Position: During the standby position the coming vessel adjust itself dynamically to 
connect to the FPSO and it may perform dynamic position operations. A possible collision 
scenario may be that the vessel losses its control and drift towards the FPSO terminal (Lloyd’s 
Register, 2014). In this case the collision frequency and collision energy may be presented as 




t = Time in standby mode (hour) 
𝑓𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡 = Frequency of losing control and drifting-off during standby (per hour)  
P = Probability of drifting towards FPSO and hit, provided that drift-off happen during 
standby position 
For impact energy calculations Eq. (2) is applicable, only difference in this case is the 
change in added mass factor from 0.1 to 0.4, as it is anticipated that the drifted tanker/vessel may 
collide sideways. 
 Collison during Tandem offloading: The drive off of a shuttle tanker may be defined as the 
“unwanted movement of the tanker away from its target location due to its own thrusters”. 
Forward drive off may lead to collision with the FPSO. The data about tandem offloading is 
scarce and is reported by Chen (2003). 
During loading mode two scenarios are possible; the tanker may drive off or drifted 
away. So the collision frequency for these two scenarios can be described as 
For drive off Collision Frequency:    𝑓𝑐 = 𝑁 × 𝑡 × 𝑓𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒−𝑜𝑓𝑓 × 𝑃 
For drive off Collision Energy Eq. (2) can be used with a =0.1. 
6.4.1 FPSO Tandem Offloading Analysis 
 The data of tandem off loadings in UK outer continental shelf for the period of 1996-2000 is 
reported by Chen (2003), and is shown in Table 31. Approximately 1300 tandem transfers were 
performed during this five year period. The data is for offshore UK and to use it for GoM 
settings correction factor may be needed, as weather is usually harsh in North Sea, so a factor of 
0.8 may be used for GoM environment. But if multiplication factor is not used, data trend shows 
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that 1 station keeping incident in every 27 loadings, 1 forward drive off in 186 loadings and one 
collision in every 325 loadings. 
Table 31: Reported incidents during tandem transfer in offshore UK (Chen-2003) 







Number of Incidents 49 7 4 
Frequency (per 
loading) 
3.769E-02 5.385E-03 3.077E-03 
 
The collision and drive off may result in structural damage and/or minor spill but no 
major oil spill incident has been reported to date. An estimate of spill related to shuttle tanker 
transportation is shown in Table 32.  





(spills per ship 
year) 
OIL SPILL RATE 






Collision  1.5 × 10
-3
 33 21418 
Contact  7.2 × 10
-4
 1 1085 
Fire/explosion  5.1 × 10
-4
 11 21792 
War Loss  5.1 × 10
-5





 42 32509 
Transfer spill  1.7 × 10
-3





 2 2991 
Grounding  5.6 × 10
-4
 38 67634 
TOTAL  6.9 × 10
-3
 128 18486 
 
Considering the different production rates and the different capacities of shuttle tankers 
shown in Table 33, approximate arrivals per year for shuttle tankers are calculated. In normal 
day to day operations typical values of shuttle tanker arrivals are usually 50-125 per year. 
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75 27.375 250 110 
  350 79 
  500 55 
100 36.5 250 146 
  350 105 
  500 73 
150 54.75 250 219 
  350 157 
  500 110 
 
Now using the historical data for incidents involving FPSO operations shown in Table 
31, an approximate estimate of number of incidents involving station keeping, drive off forward 
and collision are shown in Table 34. An approximate spill volume calculation involving shuttle 
tanker collision is also shown. 
Table 34: Shuttle tanker related incidents with approximate arrivals for the typical FPSO 













Spill Volume (bbls 
per collision) 
110 4.13 0.590 0.337 98 
78 2.95 0.421 0.241 137 
55 2.06 0.295 0.168 196 
146 5.50 0.786 0.449 73 
104 3.93 0.562 0.321 103 
73 2.75 0.393 0.225 147 
219 8.25 1.179 0.674 49 
156 5.90 0.842 0.481 69 
110 4.13 0.590 0.337 98 
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6.5 All Accidents Involving FPSO UKCS 1980-2005 
The incident data for the FPSO units working in the UK outer continental shelf is shown 
in Table 35. The data set is for limited number of units and needed to be updated, as in the recent 
past a large number of FPSO units started working worldwide, that will improve the conclusions 
to be made on the basis of data set.  
Table 35: FPSO Incident data UKCS for period of 1980-2005 reported in (HSE - RR567) 
  Type of construction 
  Purpose-built  Converted  
Type of event  No. of 
failures 
Frequency (per 





Anchor failure  13 0.135 - - 
Blowout  - - - - 
Capsize  - - - - 
Collision  - - - - 
Contact  11 0.114 - - 
Crane  42 0.436 13 0.481 
Explosion  2 0.021 - - 
Falling object  54 0.561 16 0.593 
Fire  42 0.436 12 0.444 
Foundering  - - - - 
Grounding  - - - - 
Helicopter  1 0.01 - - 
Leakage  1 0.01 - - 
List  1 0.01 - - 
Machinery  - - - - 
Off position  1 0.01 - - 
Spill/release  225 2.336 94 3.481 
Structural  3 0.031 2 0.074 
Towing/towline  - - - - 
Well problem  2 0.021 - - 




Amongst anchor failure, off position, collision and spill incidents considered in this study 
the frequency spill per unit year (2.336) reported in Table 35  is high in both purpose built and 
converted tankers and needs careful attention.  
6.6 Other FPSO Areas of Concern Identified by Researchers  
The main issues experienced by FPSO working in United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
during 1996 to 2002 are pointed out by Smith (2003). These are depicted in Figure 39. Some of 
the other issues/recommendations highlighted by him are 
 Green water loads (3 out of 4 FPSOs were affected by this) 
 Hull Strength (3 out of 4 FPSOs suffered cracks between storage tanks) 
 Improving mooring understanding for permanently moored systems 
 Turret location and design improvements 
 Layout of the vessel 
 
 




6.7 Risk Matrix 
Based on the proposed specific FPSO configuration for GoM, a risk matrix is constructed 
based on the historical trends and calculated spill volume values.  
 
Figure 40: Risk matrix for spills related to FPSO Operations 
 
6.8 FPSO Observations and Conclusions 
The deployment of FPSO for hydrocarbon production in GoM has some advantages and 
some related issues that must be taken care of. 
 The proposed FPSO configuration for the GoM has been analyzed and associated risks 
are qualitatively and quantitatively presented. 
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 It has been reported by previous researchers that risk associated with FPSO deployment 
in the GoM are comparable to other production platforms and FPSO needs additional 
considerations due to its large fluid storage capacity, station keeping requirements and oil 
transportation mechanism. 
 Most of the historical oil spills associated with FPSOs operations actually happened 
during oil transportation from FPSO to onshore facilities by shuttle tankers. 
 Reported oil spill incidents involving FPSO vessel are mainly due to loss of its position 
keeping and during fuel offloading process. These spills are of very small quantity as 
compared to shuttle tanker spills. 
 An example calculation based on the proposed configuration of FPSO for GoM has been 
performed to estimate the frequency of shuttle tanker collision with the FPSO and related 
spill amount. 
 Analysis shows that only small amount 100-200 bbl of oil spills will result due to shuttle 
collision with other vessels including FPSO, and maximum spill amount will result when 
the shuttle tanker capsizes while carrying hydrocarbons from FPSO to onshore facilities. 
 The probability of FPSO capsizing is very low, as there are no reported incidents. But if it 
is the case, a large oil spill will most probably be expected due to its large fluid storage 
capacity and other possible damages that can occur to wellheads or subsea installations. 
 Amongst the spill response technology, oil skimmers boats seem to be the most 
appropriate for spills involving shuttle tankers as these are the most frequent spills 





CHAPTER 7: OIL SPILL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH SEVERE WEATHER 
CONDITIONS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO (SCENARIO-5) 
 
 
Weather is an important factor when analyzing hazards associated with the deepwater 
drilling and production operations and offshore installations. GoM is prone to hurricanes ranging 
from category 1 to 5.  In the recent past, substantial damage has been reported to offshore 
infrastructure ranging from pipeline damage to the complete destruction of platforms during 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In GoM most of the offshore installations in the predicted path of 
the hurricane are evacuated before its arrival, therefore risk posed to personnel is not of concern 
in this case. Severe weather conditions may result in 
a) Mudslide leading to pipeline or platform damage leading to oil release to environment 
b) Adrift of offshore structures that may damage other installations  
c) Platform damage or destruction due to high wind and sea wave loads 
d) Pipeline damage or destruction due to high wind and sea wave loads 
e) Well damage and loss of well control 
Depending on the extent of the damage oil spill may happen. Another area of concern in 
terms of economic losses to oil industry is the halt of the production of oil and gas at least for 
few days. In the past it happened that the production level before the hurricane was not achieved 
even after more than a year. The subsequent sections address all of these concerns in a detailed 
manner. 
7.1 Hurricane Categories and Their Occurrences in the GoM 
The intensity of a storm is estimated from its wind speed and is usually categorized by 




Table 36: Storm classification using Saffir-Simpson Scale 
Hurricane Category Wind 
Speed 5 (Major: Catastrophic Damage) ≥157 mph 
4 (Major: Catastrophic Damage) 130–
156 mph 3 (Major: Devastating damage) 111–
129 mph 2 (Extremely dangerous) 96–
110 mph 1 (Very dangerous winds) 74–
95 mph Other classifications 
Tropical storm 39–
73 mph Tropical depression ≤38 mph 
 
The hurricane season in the GoM may vary with no hurricane activity to several 
hurricanes occurring in the same season.  A trend of sever storm activity in the GoM is shown in 
Figure 41. Historical path of the majority of big hurricanes in Figure 41, highlight a spatial 
pattern, indicating that the majority of storms passed through current or older Mississippi river 
delta. 
 
Figure 41: Historical storm paths in the GoM (From Hitchcock et al., 2006) 
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7.2 Mudslide Slide Hazard in Mississippi Current Delta 
In shallow waters of less than 400 ft, the surge wave phenomenon can result in the 
seafloor failures and a large amount of mud flow can occur from upslope of the river delta to 
deep water regions (Hitchcock et al., 2006). These mudslides may extend to several thousand 
feet in lateral direction and about 50 to 150 feet deep (Gilbert at al., 2007). Mudflow sensitive 
areas in the Mississippi delta are shown in Figure 42.  
 
 
Figure 42: Mud sensitive area in the Mississippi Delta (Hitchcock et al., 2006) 
 
The mud slide is a result of combination of high wave surge very low shear strength soft 
soil. The shallow water depth areas are more prone to mud slide in the area delineated on the 
map in Figure 42, to be mudflow sensitive area. When the shear stress generated by the wave 
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motion exceeds the soil shear strength, the mudslide is triggered. The following factor determine 
(Hitchcock et al., 2006, Nodine et al., 2007) the magnitude of mud slide 
 Slope angle 
 Water depth 
 Shear strength of sediments 
 Wave height and wave period 
 
The wave return period is also another important factor for determining the probability of 
future mudslide occurrence in mudflow prone areas.  Nodine et al., (2007), conducted the 
assessment of mudslide in the current delta of Mississippi river based on the wave return period 
and identified the sensitive areas, their results are shown in Figure 43.  
 
Figure 43: Return period of mudslides and corresponding pipelines in that region [From Nodine 
et al., 2007) 
 
7.2.1 Installation Damage and Oil Spill due to Mud Slide  
Mudslide may damage pipelines and platforms and as a result oil may be released to the 
environment depidcted in Figure 44. The Minerals Management Service in 2005, published a 
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report of 24  incidents  of  damage  to  pipelines  caused  Hurricane  Ivan. The spill due to 
pipelines and platforms damages is most probably small in magnitude, as production is usually 
stopped with the arrival of the storm. As the storm gets approaches, all personnel will are 
evacuated from the drilling rigs and platforms, and production is mostly shut down, even in the 
areas that are not directly in the path of the storm and this is the Industry’s Standard Practices. 
 
Figure 44: Pipeline and platform damage resulting in oil spills 
 
Complexity of mud slide activity was manifested during hurricane Ivan, when Taylor 
Energy’s platform “A”, in Mississippi Canyon Block 20 (approximately 11 miles offshore in 
federal waters) was toppled. The 555-foot high platform slid 400-feet down slope, resting on its 
side and partially buried in 440-feet of water, shown in Figure 45.   
 




All production piping suffered structural damage and twisted together 150-feet below the 
original mud line. There have been numerous attempts to mitigate the oil sheen still seen at the 
site; however, the incident is very complex with numerous unforeseen variables and therefore 
very difficult to respond, (Regional Response Team 6). 
7.3 Metocean Data 
Metocean Data Gulf of Mexico: API RP 2MET deals with the Metocean conditions in 
the Gulf of Mexico. It divides the GoM in four regions of west, west central, central and east, 
these regions are shown in Figure 46. 
 
Figure 46: Division for Metocean conditions and region classification (From API RP 2INT-MET 
2007). 
  
A sample data for Metocean conditions for central region is shown in Table 37. This data 




Table 37: Hurricane condition data for central GoM region (From API 2INT-MET, 2007) 
Return period (years) 10 100 1000 
Wind       
1-hour Mean Wind Speed 
(ft/s)  
108.3 157.5 220.5 
3-Sec Gust (ft/s) 153.9 241.8 370.1 
        
Wave, WD > = 3280 ft       
Maximum Wave Height (ft) 58.1 91.5 128.3 
Period of Maximum Wave (s) 11.7 13.9 16.4 
        
Currents, WD > = 492 ft       
Surface Speed (ft/s) 5.4 7.9 11 
 
7.4 Weather Induced Adrift Of Offshore Dynamic Structures 
During the past hurricanes in the GoM, especially during hurricane season of 2004 and 
2005 a large number of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) that were exposed to hurricane 
force winds had partial or complete failure of their mooring systems. During hurricane Rita, 14 
out of 16 MODUs exposed to the hurricane force winds, failed to keep their station (DNV Report 
NO. 448 14183). Most of these MODUs were stationed on location by using drag embedment 
type anchors. A MODU with mooring system is shown Figure 47, below. 
 
Figure 47: An example of spread mooring [From API-RP 2SK] 
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These drifting structures were responsible for some of the pipeline damage occurred due 
to their anchors dragging along the sea floor, and they may damage other surface/subsea 
facilities as well. Fortunately no collision of drifting MODUs occurred during hurricane seasons 
of 2005 and 2008. Map of the original rig location before the storm, their drifting path and final 
location is shown in Figure 48. There have been spills associated with anchors damaging the oil 
carrying pipelines to onshore facilities during the normal day to day operations. In one of the 
incident, the drilling rig that was towed dragged the pipeline along the seafloor 650 ft from its 
original location and 1800 bbls of oil were spilled (Hoover Mary J. 2002). 
 
 
Figure 48: Map of rig locations and paths adrift after hurricane Rita (From DNV Report 
NO. 448 14183) 
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The issue of station keeping  was addressed promptly by the industry and some new 
regulations about station keeping were introduce by MMS before the start of new hurricane 
season in 2006 (Ruinen, 2009).  
 But later on some mooring failures were also observed in Gustav and Ike hurricanes in 
2008 (Petruska et al., 2009), although these were weaker category storms when they entered 
OCS in GoM. API-RP-2SK deals with the MODU anchoring specifications. For the hurricane 
season, API recommends a risk based assessment of the mooring system. The factors that are 
taken into account for risk based system are duration for MODU mooring, infrastructure in the 
immediate vicinity of MODU and consequence modeling of the mooring line failures (Ruinen, 
2009). Keeping in view of these recommendations, the MODU operators have upgraded their 
mooring systems with bigger anchors and adding more mooring lines. A pre and post 2005 
sanctioned comparative study conducted by D’Souza et al., in 2014, shows these enhancements 
in weight and displacement capacity. Lost mooring incidents of MODUS for hurricane Gustave 
in 2008 are not reported in literature. But some of the Jack-Up rigs lost position incidents were 
reported. It can be seen from  
Table 38, that during hurricane Gustave in 2008, some of the MODUs drifted away as 
well. In terms of their capacity to damage other installations, they are comparable to moored rigs. 
Therefor adrift of whole platform due to severe weather is still a possibility. 
 
Table 38: MODUs Jack-Up drifting from their original location (From Sharples, 2009) 
Unit Name Hurricane Drift 
ENSCO 74 Gustav No Information 
Pride Wyoming Gustav 30 miles 




7.5 Pipeline Damage Due to High Wind Loads  
The majority of the pipeline damages caused by past hurricanes in the GoM mainly 
occurred at or in the vicinity of the platforms (DNV Report- 44814183), shown in Table 39. 
Some damages were also reported by the anchor dragging. There were more than 600 pipeline 
incidents reported to MMS for the Hurricane Katrina and Rita (DNV Report- 44814183). 
Outside force is the damage not directly caused by the storm. 




















Andrew 1992 485 253 10 103 44 18 57 
Lili 2002 120 16 NR* 78 NR* NR* 6 
Ivan 2004 168 20 16 67 38 9 18 
Katrina 2005 299 139 1 66 61 9 14 
Rita 2005 243 94 0 89 31 8 21 
 
It is to be pointed out that actual pipeline damages may be higher than the number of 
damage reports, as some of the reports have multiple damage details, sometimes up to 20 (DNV 
Report- 44814183).  
 




The above Table 39 only shows the number of reports that MMS received. A visual 
description of pipeline damages reported to MMS for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are shown in 
Figure 49Error! Reference source not found.. It is interesting to note that most of the damages 
seemed occurred away from the main path of the hurricane.  
7.5.1  Pipelines Damaged Types and Related Spills 
 A study sponsored by MMS (DNV Report NO. 448 14183) to investigate the causes of 
pipeline damages during hurricane Katrina and Rita, revealed that most of the reported incidents 
occurred in small diameter pipes and in shallow waters less than 100 f t. It was found that almost 
70% of the damages reported were at risers, and they occurred at the riser platform interface as 
shown in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50: Pipeline damages by its location (DNV Report NO. 448 14183) 
 
72 oil spill incidents were reported for hurricane Katrina and Rita and around 7,300 
barrels of crude oil and condensate spilled into GoM, the data is shown in Table 40Error! 
Reference source not found.. The amount of oil spilled as a result of pipeline damage is not 
very large due to the reason that before any major storm, some precautionary measures are taken 
and usually production is halted during storm period. Only the amount of oil present in the 
pipeline may be spilled when the hydrocarbon’s source is shut off. If the well is not shut off 
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properly or SCSSV fails to shut in the well, then depending on the flow potential of the reservoir 
a range of oil volume may be spilled.  
Table 40: Oil spilled due to Hurricanes Katrina & Rita (DNV Report NO. 448 14183) 
Storm Source Petroleum 
(bbl) 




Katrina Pipelines 2709.6 2709.6 43 
Rita Pipelines 4577.2 4577.2 29 
Total Pipelines 7286.8 7286.8 72 
 
7.6 Platform Damages Due To High Wind Loads 
Hurricane Andrew made a landfall on the west of Mississippi current delta and it 
destroyed 22 platforms and caused damaged to 65, amongst the 700 structures that were lying on 
its pathway. Data for other past hurricanes is shown in Table 41.  The damage caused by 
hurricanes Katrina & Rita to offshore facilities in GoM was wide spread. MMS reported that 
nearly 3050 out of 4000 platforms were in the path of these two hurricanes. 116 platforms were 
destroyed and around 52 were severely damaged by these two storms together.  




















Andrew 1992 700 22 65 3.10% 9.30% 
Lili 2002 800 2 17 0.25% 2.10% 
Ivan 2004 150 7 31 4.70% 20.10% 
Katrina 2005 1000 47 20 4.70% 2% 
Rita 2005 2050 69 32 3.30% 1.60% 
Gustav 2008 ------- 2 ------- ------- ------- 




7.6.1 Damage Categories 
 The damage assessment form the reported incident shows that, the highest incident 
involved the failure of the platforms, nearly 43%, followed by riser failure 29% and then 






  Hurricane 
Total Katrina Rita 
Platforms 233 141 92 
Risers  155 63 92 
Submerged Pipe 92 61 31 
Unknown-Other  29 14 15 
Subsea Tie-In 16 11 5 
Other Forces 17 9 8 
Grand Total 542 299 243 
Figure 51: Reported failure category distribution (From DNV Report- 44814183) 
 
The severity of the damage caused by Rita can be seen in Figure 52, in which Chevron’s 








7.6.2 Platform related Oil spill 
During hurricanes Katrina & Rita a total of 52 oil spill incidents were reported to MMS, 
and the total amount of spill was not significant in this. A total of 10,366 barrels of petroleum 
were released to the environment due to the damages or destruction to offshore structures (DNV 
Report- 44814183). The data is reported in Table 42, below.  
  










Katrina Platforms & Rigs 2842.5 2252.4 590.1 27 
Rita Platforms & Rigs 7522.9 3598.2 3924.7 25 
Total Platforms & Rigs 10365.4 5850.6 4514.8 52 
 
 
7.7 Mudslide Hazard Calculation 
The mud hazard may be defined as wave-induced pressure acting on the sea floor and 
tendency of sea floor to move (Nodine et al. 2007). The procedure to calculate the mud slide 
hazard for South Pass Block 70 in GoM, is adopted form (Nodine et al. 2007), and is described 
below:  
1-The maximum wave induced pressure, acting on the sea floor can be calculated 
with 2D approximation by the following equation  












where  γw =  water density,    Hmax = maximum wave height (ft), d = water depth, 
LHmax = Maximum wavelength 
2-The wave length associated with largest wave is calculated based on the wave 
speed and peak spectral period data from API RP MET (2007).  
𝑣 = 𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥  × 𝑡 
Where v = wave speed (ft), LHmax = wave length corresponding to maximum wave 
height, t = wave period (1/sec) 
3-Different dimensionless parameters were calculated from known values of 
water depth (d), maximum wave generated pressure (Pmax), wavelength of wave (LHmax), 
slope angle (β), soil density (γ), soil shear strength (Co) and shear strength gradient (Cz).  
 
𝛹 =  
𝛾𝐿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑎𝑛𝛽
𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥








The final product of the analysis is to determine a mudslide initiation threshold factor F. 
This threshold factor can also be defined as the ratio of the resisting moment to the driving 
moment or ratio of the developed shear stresses to the undrained shear strength of the soil 
 








The chart shown in Figure 53, is used to find the threshold value F for onset of the 
mudflow. This chart is based on the limit equilibrium model. The value of 𝛹 and 𝛺 are used to 
find the value of 𝛷 on the y-axis, then F is found from𝛷. The assumptions behind the chart are 
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that soil shear strength increases linearly with depth and assumes a rigid seafloor (Nodine et al., 
2007). 
For F ≥ 1, the soil is stable and for F< 1, it is prone to mudslide. The driving mechanism 
for mudflow is the combination of wave generated pressure, the weight of the soil and slope 
angle of sea floor. 
  
 
Figure 53: Stability chart based on limit equilibrium stability model to find the value of safety 
factor (From Nodine et al., 2007) 
 
 It is to be pointed here that not every mud slide will lead to damaging the pipeline, and 
there have been incidents reported (Nodine et al. 2007), when mudslide occurred and the pipeline 
was not damaged, it was either buried or displaced without any rupture occurring. 
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7.7.1 Example: Mudslide Risk Assessment for SP-70 Block 
An example mudslide calculation for South Pass Block 70 in the Gulf of Mexico is 
shown below. The analysis parameter are taken from Nodine et al., 2007 and based on the wave 
return period, the mudslide threshold factor is calculated. Some of the related parameters are 
shown in Table 43. 




Slope Angle  β 
(radians) 
Submerged Soil 
Density (pcf) γ 
Water  Density 
(pcf) γw 
Shear Strength 






335 0.00023 30 64 50 1.5 
 
 
The approximate location of the block SP-70 in the GoM is shown below in Figure 54. 
















The data from Table 43, is used to calculate the values of safety factor or mud threshold 
factor. Mudslide threshold factor for different categories of storms or storms with different return 
periods are shown in Table 44, below. It can be seen that storms with return period of more than 
10 years are of concern. While for a storm with 10 years return period, mudslide threshold factor 
is above 1 and mudslide most probably may not occur. 
 
Table 44: Safety factor calculations for South Pass block 70 in the Gulf of Mexico 
 
 
As pointed earlier not every mudslide will result in damaging the pipeline in such a way 
that it will lead to spill. Sometimes pipelines are just buried under the mud or shifted by the 
mudslide and they can tolerate the damage to some extent before breaking apart or leaking. It 
also depends upon the life of pipeline and its condition. If it is already corroded and near to fail, 
than even a small external movement will cause fracture in the pipeline, which can lead to oil 
spill.  
7.7.2 Spill volume calculations: mudslide resulting in pipeline damage 
 The length of the trunk line pipeline upslope from SP 70 block is approximately 8 miles, 
due to production shut off, it is assumed that only half of the line may be filled with oil and only 




















Ψ Ω Φ Threshold 
Factor F
10 0.1 52 11.7 108.3 1267 610 0.0143 38.01 2.9 1.09
25 0.04 70 13 131.6 1711 1206 0.0098 51.32 3.2 0.66
100 0.01 83.5 13.9 157.5 2189 1783 0.0085 65.68 3.3 0.56
200 0.005 87.5 14.1 167.3 2359 1965 0.0083 70.77 3.4 0.53
1000 0.001 104 15.5 196.9 3052 2668 0.0079 91.56 3.6 0.48
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than the fluid pressure exerted at the pipeline breakup point. Some oil will also flow due to 








There are two mechanisms working on the down dip portion of the damaged pipeline, 
hydrostatic pressure exerted by the column of water and gravity segregation of fluids.  At the 
rupture pint the oil can be leaked only when the hydrostatic pressure of oil in the pipeline 
exceeds the pressure exerted by the column of 335 ft of water, or due to lighter density oil will 
rise to the water column. The specific gravity of oil is taken to be 0.8. 
𝜌𝑜𝑔ℎ𝑜 ≥ 𝜌𝑤𝑔ℎ𝑤 
The amount of oil spill due to trunk pipeline rupture is shown in Table 45. The amount of 
spilled oil does not falls in the sever category for the example case studied. 
 
















25 0.04 0.663 
14 0.7 5630 
16 0.7 7353 
18 0.7 9306 
20 0.7 11489 
24 0.7 16545 
 
Terminal 
WD 335 ft Leaking Point SP-70 
Figure 55: Schematic of trunk line from leaking point to terminal  
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7.7.3 Spill volume calculations: mudslide resulting in riser damage 
Under the assumption that production was shut in before the arrival of the storm, the 
amount of oil spilled as a rupture of production risers is shown in  
Table 46. Please note that a large amount of soil movement may lead to leaking the 
wellheads as well, in those scenarios the worst case discharge rate calculations are not easy to 
perform and the worst case discharge rate calculations will involve the procedure adopted in spill 
associated with normal production operations.  
 















6 400 2 28 
6 400 4 56 
6 400 6 84 
6 400 8 112 
 
 
If the reservoir has been produced for a while, than the decline in reservoir pressure over 
the production life span before the incident happen should be taken into account as well. 
 
7.8 Mudslide resulting in severely damaging a production platform  
To simulate this case a reservoir in the block SP-70 in the GoM is shown in Table 47. 
The reservoir properties are taken from and a typical well configuration is considered for a 
typical sand depth. The well schematic and corresponding reservoir properties are shown in 








Figure 56: Selected well schematic, regional reservoir properties and the selected values used are 
shown. 
 
It was assumed that due to severe mudslide platform moved to more than 150 ft from its 
location. Platforms displacement caused the tubing and casing to be pulled up and SCSSV was 
damaged and a leak was developed. Leak point is buried under 100 ft of mud & 200 ft of water 
column with back pressure of 177 psi. Reservoir is saturated at the beginning of spill. Due to 
shallow water depth of 300 ft and TVD of only 8222 ft, duration for relief well drilling is taken 
of 60 days. The bent tubing rupture is represented by a leak. When the reservoir pressure is not 
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sufficient enough, the oil will be migrating to the sea floor due to gravity segregation process 
only and the discharging volume will be not substantial. In this study it is assumed that the leak 
diameter is a fraction of the production tubing diameter. In some of the cases, leaking diameter 
can be larger than the tubing diameter, when tubing is ruptured or due to erosion, initial leak 
diameter is enlarged.  











5482 0.089 6485 389096 
 0.179 2886 173150 
 0.268 3404 204248 
 0.357 3697 221829 
4000 0.089 3729 223755 
 0.179 5245 314676 
 0.268 5912 354739 
 0.357 6287 377250 
3000 0.089 1932 115890 
 0.179 8462 507728 
 0.268 9165 549901 
 0.357 9579 574747 
2000 0.089 0 0 
 0.179 0 0 
 0.268 0 0 
 0.357 0 0 
 
7.8.1 Modeling of Mudslide Risk 
The risk modeling or risk quantification for the mudslide during hurricane season can be 
done in the same way as described for the earlier scenarios of drilling and production and may be 
expressed as 




MSR   mudslide risk 
MSH mudslide hazard 
MSC  mudslide consequences 
 
Mudslide Hazard (MSH): Mudslide hazard may be defined and the product of probability 
of occurrence of mudslide during hurricane season and the scale on which it occurs 
MSH = Probability × Scale of mudslide 
The probability and scale both are related to the regions geological features and the 
characteristics of hurricane waves. 
Mudslide Consequences (MSC): Mudslide consequences may be expressed in terms of 
number of installations damaged in that particular region in which mudslide happens. A large 
number of offshore structures in severe mudslide prone regions will result in severe damage as 
compared to the area with least installations. This was demonstrated in the hurricane Ivan, which 
passed to the east of Mississippi delta and caused more damage, due to the number of 
installations in the mudflow prone areas. The areas along the continental slope are highlighted as 
mudslide prone area with more risk, both in terms of mudslide probability and consequences as 
well, as these areas also have some of the major offshore structures near the shore lines in 
shallow waters. 
 
7.9 Production Halt 
 It is to be pointed out here that almost all of the production activity is halted during the 
hurricane duration and usually it increases rapidly if there are not severe damages to 
installations.  It may happen that pre storm production level may not be achieved even after one 
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year, as some of the installations are permanently damaged. The percentage of GoM production 
shut in during the three major storms is shown in Table 48.   
Table 48: Production Shut-In due to hurricane, historic trends [data taken from DNV REPORT 
NO. 448 14183, 2007] 
  Oil 
Production 
Shut-In 
    
Period Ivan Katrina Rita 
Max Shut-In 82.90% 95.20% 100.00% 
1 Day After 72.50% 95.10% 100.00% 
2 Days After 64.70% 90.40% 100.00% 
3 Days After 51.50% 88.50% 100.00% 
4 Days After 41.10% 79.00% 98.60% 
5 Days After 39.20% 73.30% 97.80% 
6 Days After 34.00% 69.60% 94.70% 
7 Days After 27.70% 58.00% 92.80% 
14 Days After 28.50% 56.40% 77.50% 
 
As can be observed form the table that most of the production was shut in during the 
major storms, therefore reported spills for the hurricanes are minor in nature. This shut-in is 
usually achieved by closing the subsurface safety valves and adopting hurricane preparation 
plans developed by BSEE. 
 
7.10 Spill Response Technologies for weather induced Spill 
Depending on the type of the installation involved and the volumetric rate of 
hydrocarbons, different spill response systems could be deployed. In the case of the fluid coming 
from the inside the wellbore and provided that the well integrity is not compromised, a set of 
suction cones developed along the capping and containment systems can be used for these 
incidents. If the volumetric flow rate of hydrocarbons is high, capping stacks could also be used 
in these cases. For the cases in which hydrocarbons are flowing outside the well casings, 
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depending on the nature of the leak either cone shaped collectors shown in Figure 57, or suction 
tubes may be used. 
 
Figure 57: Cone shaped collector used in oil suction on Taylor Energy’s buried platform (from 
RRT-6) 
 
7.11 Qualitative Risk Matrix 
 Oil spill risk associated with severe weather conditions are qualitatively presented in the 
risk matrix shown in Figure 58. Based on the historical spill incident reported in the literature, 
most of the spills occurs near the platforms, due to wave and wind load damage to risers and they 
are of very small amount. So these spills have the highest frequency/probability, but their 
consequences are not very significant, as a result they lie in the yellow region in the risk matrix. 
The most serious consequences could result when the platform damage leads to a spill from 
wells as was in the case of Taylor energy’s platform. The other serious consequences may arise, 
if the wellhead is damaged and it leads to spill. It is to be pointed out that during or immediately 
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after the storm, due to problems in mobilization of the response systems, a blowing well may 







Figure 58: Qualitatively risk matrix for spills due to severe weather conditions 
 
7.12 Conclusions and Observations 
 GoM is prone to hurricanes ranging from category 1 to category 5 and in the recent past 
severe damage to pipelines and platforms has been reported, and there is always the 
possibility of a spill resulting from either pipeline or platform structural damage. 
 Severe weather may also result in drifting of floating offshore structures, especially 







collision with other platforms or their anchors dragging along the sea floor may result in 
severely damaging subsea installations and may lead to a spill.  
  A sample analysis perfomed in this study and past huuricane related spill data  shows 
that most of the spills associated with severe weather will be of small amount, as most of 
the drilling/production operations are stopped before arrival of the storm.  
 According to oil industry’s standard procedure for hurricane, all of the production in the 
expected path of the hurricane is shut down and offshore facilities are evacuated. 
Therefore damage to pipeline or platform will not lead to a large spill. 
 In shallow waters of up to 400 ft in current or old Mississippi river delta, the mudflow 
caused by high wave surge phenomenon is the biggest hazard for offshore installations.  
This mudslide may lead to a very complex situation in which it may become difficult to 
estimate the WCD rate or deploy the proper response system to stop the spill. The burial 
of Tylor’s energy’s platform is such an example. 
 The South Pass block SP-70 in the current Mississippi river delta was selected to conduct 
the mudslide quantitative risk assessment. An example calculation has been performed 
for mudslide resulting in pipeline and platform damage and resultant spill amount. 
 Aanalysis shows that a storm with return period of 10 years may trigger the mudslide in 
South Pass-70 block, which may lead to offshore faicilties damage.  
 Historical data trend shows that most of the spills reportde for past hurricane, occured in 
the vicinity of the platforms due to riser damage. The sample caluculation performed 
show an oil spill of 112 bbls only, in the case that risers are damaged in the vivinity of 
hypothetical platform in SP-70 block. Amongest the weather related spills, rsiser spills 
are most frequent but least harmfull in terms of spill amount.   
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 A worst case discharge rate of 6485 BOPD was estimated by selecting representative 
well and reservoir properties corresponding to a hypothetical production platform in the 
SP-70 block, when mudslide results in complete burial of the platform. 
 The deployment of response system in this case becomes very difficult, due to difficulty 
in exactly pointing out the source location. Some type of marking/coating on the 
conductor casing are suggested, which may be useful in this type of burial scenario to 
identify the location of the souce. 
 Adrift of floating structures is still a hazard, even after stringent regulatory requirements 
for fastening these systems. The drifting structure can damage other installations on sea 
surface or subsea and can result in very small to large oil spills. 
 Spill response systems for the weather related incidents needs enhancements, especillay 
collection domes/cones that are usually used in response to such events have not proven 











Figure 59: A qualitative presentation of risk assessment steps to be adopted for offshore structures due to adverse weather conditions
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Concluding remarks for all of five oil spill scenarios modeled in this study are given 
below. 
8.1 Scenario-1: Exploratory Well 
 An example of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for deepwater exploratory drilling well 
blowout is presented, QRA facilitated in better understanding of blowout risks. 
 The selection of a specific well and corresponding reservoir properties and taking into 
account the regional variation in reservoir properties by fitting lognormal/triangular 
distributions and conducting Monte Carlo simulations, provided a realistic representation of 
the reservoir properties to calculate the worst case discharge rates. 
 Unexpected pore pressure, delayed response to an incident and failure to detect the error 
were found to be three most important basic events contributing to the overall risk of the 
system. These were identified by conducting Fussell Vesely (FV) importance analysis.  
 The FV importance analysis emphasize the need to focus on the technologies to provide 
early warnings for unexpected pore pressure during drilling phase, eliminating the delays 
that can occur when responding to an emergency situation by automation of some of the 
decision processes and technologically improve the reliability of sensors that detect an 
error. Crew training and management is also an important element in responding to 
situations that needs immediate attention. 
 The worst case discharge rate of nearly 104,000 BOPD was estimated for the case when 
drill pipe is out of the hole and BOP offers no restriction to blowing hydrocarbons 
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(conditions specified by BSEE to estimate WCD). The occurrence of this combination of 
events is amongst the least probable situations. Therefore risk which is a product of 
probability and spilled oil volume is not very high in this case. 
 The 100,000 BOPD oil handling capacity of newly built capping and containment systems 
is nearly sufficient to either capture or contain the computed worst case discharge oil rate 
of 104,000 BPD.  
 The reservoir pressure drop and resultant reduction in flow rate are not significant in the 
cases when the fluids are flowing either through drillpipe-casing annulus or through drill 
pipe.  
 The selection of the multiphase correlation also affects the worst case discharge rate 
estimates and computed values with some other correlation may differ from the values 
computed in this study, therefore this variation in values must be considered when making 
decision based on the WCD rates.   
 Restrictions in the flow path substantially decrease the fluid flow rate and in some of the 
circumstances may even choke the flow.  
 Newly built response systems are effective in reducing the risk of large oil spill in 
deepwaters environments, provided that they function properly when they are deployed. 
Capping and containment systems are effectives for only one type of failure mode i.e., 
when the flow is coming through the well, which is the most probable scenario based on 
the historical blowout data. 
 Addition of intervention module in capping and containment systems will enhance their 
capabilities to deal with other failure modes as well. For example dynamic kill may be used 
in the case of an underground blowout.   
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 In the case of a blowing well affecting nearby wells, the situation may become complex 
and would require additional modules to be added with capping and containment systems 
or invoke other response systems. 
8.2 Scenario-2: Underground Blowout 
 The consequences of an underground blowout range from no visible damage at the sea 
surface to the loss of the whole rig. It is difficult to quantitatively estimate the risk due to 
the involvement of large number of uncertain parameters.  
 The potential of hydrocarbons leaking to sea floor is a combination of geological settings, 
the transmissibility of the paths allowing hydrocarbons to reach sea floor, the pressure of 
source reservoir and its potential to create fractures in the low lying geological barriers.  
 The formulas used to estimate the fault permeability and thickness are very simple and 
large uncertainty exists in the estimated parameters of fault permeability and its thickness. 
 The simulation result show that for low permeability k=0.004 mD fault, that connects a 
deep over pressured zone to a shallower low pressure zone, the time taken to recharge the 
shallower zone to reach its LOT pressure value is more than 100 years. 
 A high permeable faulted zone of 40 mD will take 135 years to recharge the low pressure 
shallower zone to its LOT pressure value. 
 In the reservoir model adopted  in this scenario, when the ratio of the volume of shallower 
to deeper zone decrease to 0.1, the recharging time significantly drops to 24 years only. 
Therefore ratio of the two zones is also an important parameter alongside their pressure 
differential and the transmissibility of the connecting zone.   
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 The worst conditions may occur when the hydrocarbons travel through the casing-wellbore 
annulus and may either reach to shallowest zones lying very close to mud line or leak 
outside of the well. The casing-wellbore annulus path may have very high permeability due 
to fractured cement and/or due to micro annulus gaps in this path. In this case the 
hydrocarbons may appear at the sea floor during the drilling activity. 
8.3 Scenario-3: Production Well 
 The QRA study of a deepwater production well has been performed and key contributors 
to overall system safety have been identified through fault tree analysis. 
 Sensitivity analysis of all of the basic events in the constructed Fault Tree for a sand 
screen failure leading to blowout was conducted. It turned out to that the three most 
important basic events contributing to the frequency of blowout are sand screen failures, 
subsea production tree’s control system failure and well control/other failures. 
 It has been suggested by other researchers that the design improvements of the sand screen 
will greatly reduce their failure rates and in turn blowout frequency associated with 
production well, as it is one of the most sensitive/important basic event in the system 
setup, considered for this scenario. 
 Subsea production tree’s control system is the second most important basic event in the 
system, and even a small improvement in the reliability of control system will greatly 
influence the blowout frequency of the entire system. 
 Monte Carlo simulation results for blowout probability show a range of values between 
1.54-2.0 ×10
-5
 per well-year, when each of the basic events is varied by ±10%. 
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 A WCD rate of 34,546 BOPD was estimated using multiphase fluid simulations and it is 
well within the fluid handling capacity of newly built response systems called capping and 
containment systems. Newly built response systems are effective in reducing the risk of 
large oil spill in deepwater environments. Additional tools like adopter spools may be 
needed to connect capping stack to subsea trees with different connector profiles. 
 The blowout frequency modeled by FTA is based on the historical data and therefore it is a 
conservative estimate. When recent technological improvements are incorporated into 
FTA, the blowout frequency will be reduced, as in the past few years there have been 
major improvements in well safety related procedures. New regulatory requirements, 
equipment reliability improvements and extensive training of crew, all of these will 
contribute in lowering the blowout frequency estimates. 
8.4 Scenario-4: FPSO 
The deployment of FPSO for hydrocarbon production in GoM has some advantages and 
some related issues that must be taken care of. 
 The proposed FPSO configuration for the GoM has been analyzed and associated risks 
are qualitatively and quantitatively presented. 
 It has been reported by previous researchers that risk associated with FPSO deployment 
in the GoM are comparable to other production platforms and FPSO needs additional 
considerations due to its large fluid storage capacity, station keeping requirements and oil 
transportation mechanism. 
 Most of the historical oil spills associated with FPSOs operations actually happened 
during oil transportation from FPSO to onshore facilities by shuttle tankers. 
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 Reported oil spill incidents involving FPSO vessel are mainly due to loss of its position 
keeping and during fuel offloading process. These spills are of very small quantity as 
compared to shuttle tanker spills. 
 An example calculation based on the proposed configuration of FPSO for GoM has been 
performed to estimate the frequency of shuttle tanker collision with the FPSO and related 
spill amount. 
 Analysis shows that only small amount 100-200 bbl of oil spills will result due to shuttle 
collision with other vessels including FPSO, and maximum spill amount will result when 
the shuttle tanker capsizes while carrying hydrocarbons from FPSO to onshore facilities. 
 The probability of FPSO capsizing is very low, as there are no reported incidents. But if it 
is the case, a large oil spill will most probably be expected due to its large fluid storage 
capacity and other possible damages that can occur to wellheads or subsea installations. 
 Amongst the spill response technology, oil skimmers boats seem to be the most 
appropriate for spills involving shuttle tankers as these are the most frequent spills 
involving production from FPSO. 
8.5 Scenario-5: Weather Induced Spills 
 GoM is prone to hurricanes ranging from category 1 to category 5 and in the recent past 
severe damage to pipelines and platforms has been reported, and there is always the 
possibility of a spill resulting from either pipeline or platform structural damage. 
 Severe weather may also result in drifting of floating offshore structures, especially 
MODUs. These drifting structures may pose threat to other offshore facilities. Their 
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collision with other platforms or their anchors dragging along the sea floor may result in 
severely damaging subsea installations and may lead to a spill.  
 A sample analysis perfomed in this study and past huuricane related spill data  shows that 
most of the spills associated with severe weather will be of small amount, as most of the 
drilling/production operations are stopped before arrival of the storm.  
 According to oil industry’s standard procedure for hurricane, all of the production in the 
expected path of the hurricane is shut down and offshore facilities are evacuated. 
Therefore damage to pipeline or platform will not lead to a large spill. 
 In shallow waters of up to 400 ft. in current or old Mississippi river delta, the mudflow 
caused by high wave surge phenomenon is the biggest hazard for offshore installations.  
This mudslide may lead to a very complex situation in which it may become difficult to 
estimate the WCD rate or deploy the proper response system to stop the spill. The burial 
of Taylor energy platform is such an example. 
 The South Pass block SP-70 in the current Mississippi river delta was selected to conduct 
the mudslide quantitative risk assessment. An example calculation has been performed 
for mudslide resulting in pipeline and platform damage and resultant spill amount. 
 Aanalysis shows that a storm with return period of 10 years may trigger the mudslide in 
South Pass-70 block, which may lead to offshore faicilties damage.  
 Historical data trend shows that most of the spills reportde for past hurricane, occured in 
the vicinity of the platforms due to riser damage. The sample caluculation performed 
show an oil spill of 112 bbls only, in the case that risers are damaged in the vivinity of 
hypothetical platform in SP-70 block. Amongest the weather related spills, rsiser spills 
are most frequent but least harmfull in terms of spill amount.   
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 A worst case discharge rate of 6485 BOPD was estimated by selecting representative 
well and reservoir properties corresponding to a hypothetical production platform in the 
SP-70 block, when mudslide results in complete burial of the platform. 
 The deployment of response system in this case becomes very difficult, due to difficulty 
in exactly pointing out the source location. Some type of marking/coating on the 
conductor casing are suggested, which may be useful in this type of burial scenario to 
identify the location of the souce. 
 Adrift of floating structures is still a hazard, even after stringent regulatory requirements 
for fastening these systems. The drifting structure can damage other installations on sea 
surface or subsea and can result in very small to large oil spills. 
 Spill response systems for the weather related incidents needs enhancements, especillay 
collection domes/cones that are usually used in response to such events have not proven 
very useful in past. 
 
8.6 Approximations and Limitations  
The following are the approximations and limitations of this study 
 When conclusions have to be made based on the worst case discharge rates, the 
uncertainty/variation in the regional reservoir properties used to estimate the WCD 
should be considered as well. Therefore instead of a single value for WCD, a range of 
values will most probably justify the underlying assumptions. 
 In estimating WCD, wellbore walls were considered as smooth as having uniform 
circular shape. This condition may not hold well in all the cases and addition of 
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roughness of wellbore walls due to mud cake or irregular shape of the wellbore due to 
drilling may lead to either low or raise the WCD estimates. 
 Multiphase fluid flow correlations used to estimate WCD have their own uncertainties, 
due to underlying assumptions/simplification in developing these steady state models. 
The WCD estimate may differ amongst different multiphase fluid flow models. 
 The component failure data available to author and used for production scenario is not the 
most updated data set available to large offshore operators. The data used set includes 
offshore reliability data up to 2001, and there has been a lot of offshore activities between 
2001 and now. Therefore including the latest data will improve the accuracy of results. 
 The BOP and production tree were modeled as a single component, and were not 
resolved into network of rams/valves and chokes. A detailed model by using the recent 
component data will definitely improve the reliability or failure rate prediction of these 
systems. 
8.7 Future Directions 
The study has the potential to expand in many dimensions; some of them are pointed 
here. Most of these can only be performed with access to extensive current data sets available 
and may need team work as well. 
 For the exploratory drilling scenario, the failure rate of risers may be included in the 
analysis, that will incorporate the systems above BOP and whole drilling system may be 
analyzed including the type of rig. 
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 The subsea production filed analysis is another area that warrants attention and the entire 
production system can be modeled, starting form reservoir and terminating at the 
production facility. 
 The GoM lease block may be taken as bases for a comprehensive weather induced risk 
analysis and a model database may be generated. The input parameters could be the 
locations and type of the offshore facility. The output may be a report including the entire 
hazards associated with that particular location and facility type under various scenarios 
of severe weather.   
 The component failure data used in constructing the fault tree can be used to carry out the 
system reliability analysis as well. The systems may be represented as series or parallel 
combination and their mean time before the failure can be found. This may be very useful 
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Top 5 0.2 
100 0.3 173 131 0.02 0.0066 
5 0.7 174 135 0.02 0.0154 
50 0.4 
100 0.3 1210 924 0.13 0.0132 
5 0.7 1210 924 0.13 0.0308 
100 0.4 
100 0.3 1999 1522 0.22 0.0132 
5 0.7 1998 1521 0.22 0.0308 
Annulus 0.78 
Top 5 0.2 
100 0.3 167 124 0.02 0.0468 
5 0.7 164 124 0.02 0.1092 
50 0.4 
100 0.3 1113 848 0.12 0.0936 
5 0.7 1115 848 0.12 0.2184 
100 0.4 
100 0.3 1893 1440 0.21 0.0936 
5 0.7 1893 1440 0.21 0.2184 
Open 
Hole 
0.11 100 1 
100 0.3 1828 1394 0.20 0.033 






APPENDIX-B:  HISTORICAL SPILLS (INCLUDING ALL) AND THEIR CAUSES IN GOM 
Table 50: Historical GoM and PAC Pipeline Spill and their Causes (1972-2010) [Table is taken from (Bercha, 2013)] 
CAUSE  
CLASSIFICATION 
 Small and Medium Spills     
50-999 bbl 

































CORROSION 6.67 3 
334,764 
0.896 5.88 1 
334,764 
0.299 
External 2.22 1 0.299    
Internal 4.44 2 0.597 5.88 1 0.299 
THIRD PARTY 
IMPACT 
20.00 9 2.688 64.71 11 3.286 
Anchor Impact 15.56 7 2.091 35.29 6 1.792 
Jackup Rig or Spud Barge 2.22 1 0.299 5.88 1 0.299 
Trawl/Fishing Net 2.22 1 0.030 23.53 4 1.195 
OPERATION IMPACT 6.67 3 0.896 5.88 1 0.299 
Rig Anchoring 2.22 1 0.299    
Work Boat Anchoring 4.44 2 0.597 5.88 1 0.299 
MECHANICAL 6.67 3 0.896    
Connection Failure 4.44 2 0.597    
Material Failure 2.22 1 0.299    
NATURAL HAZARD 53.33 24 7.169 23.53 4 1.195 
Mud Slide 4.44 2 0.597 5.88 1 0.299 
Storm/ Hurricane 48.89 22 6.572 17.65 3 0.896 
UNKNOWN 6.67 3 0.896    







Table 51: GoM and PAC OCS Platform Hydrocarbon Spill Statistics (1977-2010) [Table is taken from (Bercha, 2013] 
CAUSE 
CLASSIFICATION  
















































HUMAN ERROR  11.81 15 0.611    
COLLISION  0.79 1 0.041    
WEATHER  3.94 5 0.204 25.00 2 0.081 
HURRICANE  51.97 66 2.689 50.00 4 0.163 
UNKNOWN     12.50 1 0.041 
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